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This Article proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I explain the rise
of genetic genealogical testing and how it is employed by police for forensic
genetic genealogy (FGG). I also clarify how FGG is different from a
traditional search of the federal Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
database. In the second part, I challenge the many concerns that scholars have
raised in response to FGG. Specifically, I counter the arguments that it violates
the Fourth Amendment, invades the privacy of innocent individuals, renders people
unintentional genetic informants, improperly relies on police deception and the
involuntary participation of suspects, and creates a de facto federal database.
These concerns reflect misunderstandings of ordinary criminal procedure, the legal
might of online user “agreements,” and the distinctions between clinical research
and criminal law. In the third part, I provide a unique theory for why we seem to
fear “genetic informants.” I conclude with a call for more nuanced policy measures
that will better protect genetic privacy consistent with consumer expectations, while
still permitting the use of FGG to deliver justice to victims and help convict serial
killers and rapists.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer genetics has exploded, driven by the second-most
popular hobby in the United States: genealogy.1 Kits from the
market leaders—23andMe and Ancestry—are top-sellers on Black
Friday.2 As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports,
ancestry tests that have been bundled with information on genetic
health risks are selling “like hotcakes,” and direct-to-consumer
(DTC) genetic tests have “continued to skyrocket.”3 These kits allow
users to submit a saliva sample through the mail, without the
involvement of a physician, and test for about 700,000 genetic
mutations. The results are then returned to them online.
This “hobby” has been co-opted by law enforcement to solve
cold cases. Officers can link crime-scene DNA with the DNA of one
of the assailant’s relatives, which had been previously uploaded to a
non-forensic, DTC genetic database. A 2018 study predicted that
within a couple of years roughly 90% of Americans of European
descent will be genetically identifiable in this way, even those who
have never submitted a saliva sample nor been tested themselves.4 A
Scott Bowen & Muin J. Khoury, Consumer Genetic Testing Is Booming: But
What Are the Benefits and Harms to Individuals and Populations?, CENTER FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: GENOMICS AND PRECISION HEALTH (June 12, 2018),
https://blogs.cdc.gov/genomics/2018/06/12/consumer-genetic-testing.
2.
Shanna Mason, Privacy of Information and DNA Testing Kits, 27 CATH.
U.J.L. & TECH. 161, 161 (2018) (“In 2017, AncestryDNA sold roughly 1.5 million
kits from Black Friday through Cyber Monday, triple the amount of sales from
2016.”).
3.
Bowen & Khoury, supra note 1.
4.
Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range
Familial Searches, 362 SCIENCE 690, 690 & 691 fig.1 (2018); see also Heather
Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy Databases,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogystudy.html?module=inline.
1.
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relative’s genetic data can act as a silent witness, or genetic
informant, against the person who left the DNA at the crime scene.
This “genetic informant” wordlessly guides law enforcement to a
handful of potential suspects, by simply informing them that the
suspect is very likely a third-cousin, nephew, or grandson of the
person in the DTC database. Public records and newspaper
clippings then provide the necessary details to put a name and
location to the crime-scene DNA.
At least thirty murderers and rapists have been arrested after
detectives identified them through a combination of genetic testing
and genealogy research tools. This general method has been dubbed
“genetic genealogy”—the use of DNA to infer relationships between
individuals.5 Given the hundreds of thousands of cold cases in the
U.S., with some unknown number of case files containing DNA
samples, experts predict that genetic genealogy will become a
multimillion dollar forensic business.6 One method in particular,
called “forensic genetic genealogy,” or FGG, has allowed law
enforcement to significantly reduce the size of the suspect pool when
no other good leads exist.7
The public generally seems to support the use of genetic
genealogy to apprehend violent criminals in cold cases, even when
the individual contributing her DNA to a genealogical website had
no notice her sample would be used in this way.8 However, legal
scholars have sounded many alarms. In op-eds in the New York

Peter Aldous, The Golden State Killer Case Has Spawned a New Forensic
Science Industry, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-dnabusiness-parabon-bode.
6.
Id.
7.
Ellen Greytak et al., Privacy and Genetic Genealogy Data, 361 Sᴄɪᴇɴᴄᴇ 857
(2018); Interim Policy: Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching, DEP’T
OF JUSTICE 6 (2019), www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download;
Heather Murphy, Genealogists Turn to Cousins’ DNA and Family Trees to Crack Five
More Cold Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/science/dna-family-trees-coldcases.html (Referring to FGG as “long range familial searches,” or LRFS).
8.
The majority of Americans polled support police searches of genetic
websites that identify genetic relatives and disclosure of DTC genetic testing
customer information, as well as creation of fake profiles of individuals by police
on genealogy websites. Respondents were much more supportive of these
activities when the purpose was to identify perpetrators of violent crimes than
when the purpose was to identify perpetrators of nonviolent crimes. However,
the sample was more likely than the rest of the population to have been the
victim of a crime. See Christi Guerrini et al., Should Police Have Access to Genetic
Genealogy Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a
Controversial New Forensic Technique, 16 PLOS BIOLOGY e2006906, *3 (2018).
5.
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Times9 and Slate,10 in scientific and legal scholarly articles,11 and in
lobbying efforts with their legislatures,12 legal scholars have called
for limitations or bans on these practices. Some propose requiring
law enforcement to get warrants before police can access DTC
genetic databases or immediately banning FGG and other genetic
genealogy tools. In Maryland, legislators proposed a bill in 2019 to
prohibit the searching of genealogical databases to find distant
relatives of criminal suspects.13
The opponents’ concerns are many, but they can generally
be boiled down to fears that these new methods will invade the
privacy and autonomy of presumptively innocent individuals by
creating an involuntary and de facto forensic genetic database.14
These concerns, I argue, are considerably overblown. Indeed, many
aspects of FGG implicate nothing new, legally or ethically, and
might even better protect the privacy of innocent individuals. That’s
right. This methodology might reduce the privacy violations that are
rampant in ordinary police investigations. So why are so many legal
scholars fascinated by genetic genealogy yet fear a world where law
enforcement uses FGG? What is it about this methodology that
triggers knee-jerk calls to ban the use of “genetic informants?”
We are right to be concerned about unleashing private,
genetic information to the government or private actors. We are still
9.
Elizabeth Joh, Opinion, Want to See My Genes? Get a Warrant, N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/police-dna-warrant.html.
10.
Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database,
SLATE (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-database-lawenforcement-genetic-genealogy.html.
11.
Natalie Ram et al., Genealogy Databases and the Future of Criminal Investigation,
360 SCIENCE 1078, 1079 (2018).
12.
Natalie Ram, Incidental Informants Police Can Use Genealogy Databases to
Help Identify Criminal Relatives-but Should They?, MD. B.J., July-Aug. 2018, at 8, 10.
13.
H.B. 30, 440th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Md. 2019) (“For the
purpose of prohibiting a person from performing a search of a certain DNA or
genealogical data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in
connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of
the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired; and generally relating
to DNA analysis.”).
14.
Privacy is a multifaceted concept that can include the right to be left
alone, to be free from surveillance, to remain anonymous, to keep your
information confidential, or entirely private, or to ensure that what is said about
you is true. Each of these privacy concepts is potentially implicated here, as well
as the additional idea that your privacy can be violated in ways that exploit you
and violate your autonomy. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 477, 505-24 (2005); Ellen W. Clayton et al., A Systematic Literature
Review of Individuals’ Perspectives on Privacy and Genetic Information in the United States,
13 PLOS ONE e0204417, *14-18 (2018).
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unlocking the secrets of our genomes, and yet the promised value of
using genetic data to guide health care treatment is enormous.15
Because there is a great deal of money to be made developing health
care products that are tailored to individuals based on their genomic
information (the goal of so-called “precision medicine”), many
private and public research institutions would love to get their hands
on large datasets of genetic information, especially when that
information is coupled with multi-generational pedigrees, traits, and
lifestyle choices. Analysts estimate the global market for precision
medicine initiatives will increase from an estimated $92.4 billion in
2017 to $194.4 billion by 2024.16 The value of the data that
23andMe and Ancestry store is colossal. There is, therefore, a great
risk of deliberate data breaches or weak user privacy protections.17
By concentrating on law enforcement’s use of FGG, and
failing to address the larger risks of genetic research and disclosure,
these privacy scholars miss the mark. Law enforcement’s use of
genetic genealogy to solve cold cases is a bogeyman. The larger
threat to genetic privacy comes from shoddy consumer consent
procedures used by DTC genetic companies, poor data security
standards, and user agreements that permit rampant secondary uses
of the users’ DNA and data. Unless police drastically expand the way
they are conducting genetic genealogical searches, there is too much
fear and fascination surrounding this methodology. This Article
seeks to demystify this unfounded fear.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I
explain the rise of genetic genealogical testing and how it is
employed by police for FGG. I also clarify how FGG is different
from a traditional search of the federal Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) database.18 In the second part, I challenge the
15.
Geoffrey Ginsburg & Kathryn Phillips, Precision Medicine: From Science to
Value, 37 HEALTH AFF. 694, 694 (2018) (“The assembly of genomic,
environmental, digital health, and patient-reported data from a variety of
sources serves as the foundation for a powerful precision medicine platform that,
when coupled to other national and global data and clinical networks, will lead
to the dissemination of knowledge that will enable other health care delivery
systems to benefit.”).
16.
Global Personalized Medicine Market 2017-2018 & 2024: Market is Projected
to Reach US$194.4 Billion by 2024 from an Estimated US$92.4 Billion in 2017, PR
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 15, 2018, 7:45 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/global-personalized-medicine-market-2017-2018--2024-market-isprojected-to-reach-us194-4-billion-by-2024-from-an-estimated-us92-4-billion-in2017--300730848.html.
17.
Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for Breaching and Protecting
Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REV. GENETICS 409, 409 (2014).
18.
The Combined DNA Index System of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is commonly referred to as CODIS and is the federal database that
contains the short-tandem repeat satellite markers at 13 or 20 non-coding
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many concerns that scholars have raised in response to FGG.
Specifically, I counter the arguments that it violates the Fourth
Amendment, invades the privacy of innocent individuals, renders
people unintentional genetic informants, improperly relies on police
deception and the involuntary participation of suspects, and creates
a de facto federal database. These concerns reflect misunderstandings
of ordinary criminal procedure, the legal might of online user
“agreements,” and the distinctions between clinical research and
criminal law. In the third part, I provide a unique theory for why we
seem to fear “genetic informants.” I conclude with a call for more
nuanced policy measures that will better protect genetic privacy
consistent with consumer expectations, while still permitting the use
of FGG to deliver justice to victims and help convict serial killers and
rapists.
II. THE EXPLOSION OF CONSUMER GENETICS
In the last few years, the cost for genetic testing has dropped
considerably, and the large genetic ancestry companies have also
lowered their prices, resulting in a predictable spike in demand.19
One market leader, Ancestry, boasts over 15 million customers while
its primary competitor, 23andMe, has more than 10 million
customers.20 One consumer genetics businessman remarked that
“the inflection point [for DTC genetic test sales] started in the
summer of 2016, and from there it’s gone into the stratosphere.”21
Most of these sales have occurred in the United States, and roughly
1 in 25 Americans have had their samples analyzed online, without
involving a physician or geneticist.22 It is fair to say that the market
for DTC genetic tests is booming.

regions for the individuals who have been sampled. The sampled population
consists mostly of criminal offenders, but has been expanded to include arrestees.
States may contribute to the federally-maintained database. See 34 U.S.C. §
40702 (2012).
19.
Jie Yuan et al., DNA.Land is a Framework to Collect Genomes and Phenomes in
the Era of Abundant Genetic Information, 50 NATURE GENETICS 160, 160 (2018); Tim
Caulfield & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Perceptions, Problems,
and Policy Responses, 63 ANN. REV. MED. 23, 23 (2012); see also Bowen & Khoury,
supra note 1.
20.
See About Us, 23ANDME,
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/; Ancestry.com Surpasses
15 Million DNA Customers, ANCESTRY,
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2019/05/31/ancestry-surpasses-15million-dna-customers.
21.
Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year DNA Consumer Testing Blew Up,
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumerdna-testing-blew-up.
22.
Id.
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However, the many DTC companies are considerably
different from one another. Some offer tests that claim to match
romantic partners based on their genetic soulmate, others create
personalized travel holidays, and still others purport to identify
favorite beverages, all based entirely on your genetic results.23 Some
even market themselves as being able to predict “how gay you are,”
by relying on a study that itself specifically dismissed the idea that
their results could be used on individuals.24 These kinds of tests lack
clinical and analytic validity, and are a form of pseudoscience
quackery.25 Somewhere in the middle are health-related tests that
claim to screen for food allergies or common drug side effects, with
some following laboratory and privacy best practices, and others not.
Then on the other end of the spectrum are the reputable DTCcompanies such as 23andMe and Ancestry. These companies began
by offering ancestry testing and have now branched out to offer
health-related information.26
So far, it does not seem that finding out about an elevated
risk for some disease changes behaviors, and in some cases it
probably should not. The health-related risk information is often of
very weak predictive value, particularly for complex diseases like
cancer. Results often reflect small increases in overall lifetime risk,
and cannot be interpreted without knowing someone’s family
history, personal risk, and environmental factors. Therefore, using
DTC genetic tests to make health care decisions is often
premature.27 At present, it seems that most people pursue DTC
genetic testing because they are tantalized by the idea of having as
much information about themselves as possible, even information
that has little predictive value.
A. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies are Under-Regulated and
Provide Inadequate Consent and Privacy Protections

James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A
Survey of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies,
28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 36–37 (2018).
24.
Bizarrely, the app developers claimed it would be “absurd” for anyone
to use the app in the way it was marketed, as its small-font disclosures technically
warned that the app was not to be used to predict same-sex attraction. See Amy
Maxmen, ‘Gay Gene’ App Provokes Fears of a Genetic Wild West, 574 NATURE 609,
609 (2019).
25.
Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23.
26.
See Megan A. Allyse et al., Direct-to-Consumer Testing 2.0: Emerging Models
of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 113, 116-117 (2018).
27.
Jason Park et al., Question & Answer, Privacy in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing, 65 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 612, 613 (2019) (noting that “there is no solid
evidence to support the contention that providing individuals with genetic
information will . . . impact [their lifestyle choices].”).
23.
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Because the DTC genetic testing industry is under-regulated,
the quality of the privacy protections and clinical and analytic
validity of the DTC genetic tests vary considerably.28 This puts
consumers at risk of data breaches with massive implications. Due
to ineffective consent procedures at the initial stage when users
submit a saliva sample and the failure of sites to require validation
of user identities or to provide secure encryption, users may be
unwittingly supplying the secrets of their genome to absolute
strangers.29 These strangers could then sell or share the valuable
genetic profile data for legal (or illegal) insurance under-writing or
pharmaceutical advertising schemes.
Importantly, there are no constitutional limitations on
nefarious uses of data by private actors, and the federal Genetic
Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) provides inadequate
protection.30 For example, GINA allows employers to use genetic
risk information that they discover through “commercially available
publications” such as newspapers, which might include websites like
GEDMatch.31 Further, GINA does not apply to life or disability
insurance, and it requires that the discriminatory behavior be
exposed. As with many forms of discrimination, detection is
notoriously difficult, as is proving the intent behind the employer’s
or insurer’s behavior. It is possible to argue that someone’s insurance
was priced the way it was or an adverse employment decision was
made on some other pretextual, non-genetic basis. For example, in
the context of racial discrimination, it is possible for an employer to
successfully argue that the individual was fired due to very recent,
and possibly fabricated, work performance issues, rather than due to
the experience of racial bias. In the absence of data showing a
disparate impact on a large number of employees, there is plausible
deniability that the employer did not engage in intentionally
unlawful employment discrimination. The same could occur with
GINA. Finally, GINA is not written in stone; it is simply a
Congressional statute that could be repealed. The privacy and
security risks associated with DTC genetic testing led Senate
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) to hold a press conference
in 2017 to call for more regulatory oversight of DTC genetic

28.
Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23, at 40 (“DTC-GT remains largely
unregulated in the majority of jurisdictions.”).
29.
Caitlin Curtis et al., Protecting Trust in Medical Genetics in the New Era of
Forensics, 21 GENETICS MED. 1483, 1483-84 (2019) (proposing that “[i]t must not
be possible for an individual to unwittingly sign an agreement that results in loss
of control of their genetic data.”).
30.
See PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
GENETIC INFORMATION, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2019).
31.
Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2019).
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testing.32 Specifically, he asked the Federal Trade Commission to
look closely at this industry and ensure that companies have fair
privacy policies as well as adequate informed consent procedures.
This has yet to occur.
This is big business and big data research—ancestry testing
is just the gateway. Essentially, these companies are enormous
biobanks. Because DTC genetic testing companies often also have
pedigree and personal information, their genetic databases could be
instrumental in assessing genetic risk for complex diseases. This
makes their data incredibly valuable to pharmaceutical companies
and clinical researchers, and Ancestry and 23andMe have
publicized their relationships with these types of research bodies.
Unfortunately, the Common Rule, which provides
protection for human subjects in research,33 and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which
provides a bare minimum of protection for the security and privacy
of identifiable health information,34 do not apply to research that
occurs outside of a health care setting and that is not federally
funded.35 Users may incorrectly expect certain health-related
privacy regulations to apply because of the quasi-clinical nature of
the information.36
Even if companies were to voluntarily comply with HIPAA,
we cannot rely on existing laws to protect us because it is impossible
to completely anonymize genomic information.37 Every few months,
32.
Schumer Reveals: Popular at Home DNA Test Kits Are Putting Consumer Privacy
at Great Risk, as DNA Firms Could Sell Your Most Personal Info & Genetic Data to AllComers; Senator Pushes Feds to Investigate & Ensure Fair Privacy Standards for All DNA Kits,
CHARLES E. SCHUMER: UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR NEW YORK (Nov. 26,
2017),
https://www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumerreveals-popular-at-home-dna-test-kits-are-putting-consumer-privacy-at-greatrisk-as-dna-firms-could-sell-your-most-personal-info-and-genetic-data-to-allcomers-senator-pushes-feds-to-investigate_ensure-fair-privacy-standards-for-alldna-kits.
33.
45 C.F.R. § 46 (2019).
34.
45 C.F.R. § 160 (2019); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2019).
35.
See Clayton et al., supra note 14, at *14 (“The U.S. Common Rule also
permits the use of de-identified data without consent and with limited to no IRB
oversight and endorses an expansive role for broad consent of identified data.”).
36.
Park et al., supra note 27, at 614-15 (discussing the risks of cyber-attacks
to DTC genetic testing databases, such as those waged on the 100000 Genomes
Project data in the United Kingdom).
37.
This will be discussed in more detail below. Nora von Thenen et al.,
Re-Identification of Individuals in Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons Via Allele Inference, 35
BIOINFORMATICS 365, 365 (2019). See also Bridget F.B. Algee-Hewitt et al.,
Individual Identifiability Predicts Population Identifiability in Forensic Microsatellite Markers,
26 CURRENT BIOLOGY 935, 937 (2016) (finding that forensic markers have
nontrivial ancestry information); Michael D. Edge et al., Linkage Disequilibrium
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new methods are developed to use genetic datasets and public
records to re-identify anonymized samples. Given the enormous
potential of genetic information to reveal health risks in the future,
we need to restrict access to this information in ways that might at
first seem paternalistic. More will be said below about how we might
improve the consent procedures and limit secondary uses, but we
should also reconsider whether health-related information should
ever be relayed without a physician’s or genetic counselor’s
interpretation.
B. DTC Genetic Tests That Rely on SNP Data Reveal More Than Just
Ancestry
The genetics revolution, fueled in part by an explosion in
DTC genetic testing, is upon us. In 2017 alone, about 7 million
genetic testing kits were sold directly to individuals, and 20 million
kits were expected to be sold in 2018.38 Driven mostly by
genealogical hobbyists, the majority of the DTC ancestry genetic
testing services rely on single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs),
which are mutations at the level of the individual nucleotides. While
SNP data is not nearly as rich as data gathered from sequencing, it
still provides a significant amount of information about future risk of
disease.
SNP data can also reveal whether users share segments of their
genome with other users, predicting relatedness through a common
ancestor. This works by analyzing the percentage of overlapping bits
of genetic code, so-called “identical by descent” sections, that one
shares with relatives. Assuming no historical inbreeding, one likely
shares roughly 12% of their genome with first cousins, about 3%
with second cousins, and less than 1% with third cousins.39 Thus,
by finding and quantifying overlapping genetic regions, DTC
companies can predict genetic familial relationships. However,
because parents do not contribute exactly half of their genome to
their offspring and the reshuffling of DNA can be random, third
cousins may share more DNA fragments than second cousins.40
Since genetic inheritance varies from child to child, as one moves
Matches Forensic Genetic Records to Disjoint Genomic Marker Sets, 114 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 5671, 5671-76 (2017) (finding that genetic databases can be
compared to identify individuals).
38.
Erlich et al., supra note 4 at 690; Park et al., supra note 27, at 612.
39.
Average Percent DNA Shared Between Relatives, 23ANDME,
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/212170668-Averagepercent-DNA-shared-between-relatives (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
40.
Catherine Rehder et al., American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics:
Standards and Guidelines for Documenting Suspected Consanguinity as an Incidental Finding
of Genomic Testing, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 150, 151 (2013).
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beyond the level of third cousins, there is a decent chance that a
known genealogical relationship will not be detectable genetically.41
In addition to predicting genealogical relationships, some
DTC genetic tests now reveal SNPs linked to developing diseases
and other traits.42 While most complex traits cannot be reliably and
accurately predicted through SNP data, there are thousands of
individual mutations or “genotypes” that can increase the likelihood
of developing a particular trait or “phenotype.” Some companies
require a physician to order these test kits, but the most popular ones
do not.43 Other niche tests focus on so-called “recreational” traits
like detecting the smell of asparagus in urine or identifying
nutritional needs and possible food allergies.
The leading consumer genetics companies, 23andMe and
Ancestry, allow consumers to download their raw genetic data in
plain-text format, which can then be uploaded to third-party
websites.44 These websites provide a range of additional services,
including interpreting the clinical relevance of mutations and
allowing individuals to expand the reach of their genealogical
search. Up to 62% of DTC customers will upload their genetic data
to third-party websites for free or for a small fee.45 One such thirdparty website is GEDMatch, an open-access service that is free for
the most basic searches.46
C. Third-Party Sites Like GEDMatch Facilitate FGG
GEDMatch users can connect with even more distant
relatives who used different testing services like FamilyTreeDNA or
My Heritage. They do so by uploading their SNP profile, generated
elsewhere, onto GEDMatch. The raw SNP data is analyzed using a
simple algorithm, and the site then produces a list of likely relatives
41.
Michael Edge & Graham Coop, How Lucky Was the Genetic Investigation in
the Golden State Killer Case?, BIORXIV 5 (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2019/01/29/531384.full.pdf.
42.
In 2013, the FDA sent cease and desist letters to 23andMe, ordering
them to stop marketing and selling their health-related testing services until they
received FDA approval for these devices. In 2017, the FDA approved
23andMe’s carrier screening for hereditary Bloom syndrome, which created
“DTC Testing 2.0.” There was now precedent and a pathway for including
disease-risk in the DTC panels. See Megan A. Allyse et al., Direct-to-Consumer
Testing 2.0: Emerging Models of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 113, 116-117 (2018).
43.
Eline M. Bunnik et al., Informed Consent in Direct-to-Consumer Personal
Genome Testing: The Outline of a Model Between Specific and Generic Consent, 28
BIOETHICS 343, 343-44 (2014).
44.
Erlich et al., supra note 4, at 690.
45.
See Maxmen, supra note 24, at 610.
46.
GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated May 18, 2019).
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automatically, without the need to share any underlying genetic
information with the putative relative. In just a few years,
GEDMatch has cultivated a large community of hundreds of
thousands of users.47 While the user agreements of 23andMe and
Ancestry state that they will not disclose users’ genetic data without
a legal subpoena or warrant and that users must not submit samples
under false identities,48 GEDMatch’s agreement has never included
such guarantees. In fact, GEDMatch allows users to use an alias
rather than their real names to register.49 In 2018, GEDMatch made
explicit in their user agreement that law enforcement could submit
profiles from crime scene DNA to find a suspect’s distant relatives.50
Even before then, however, the GEDMatch user agreement
included the following warning: “DNA and Genealogical research,
by its very nature, requires the sharing of information. Because of
that, users participating in this site should expect that their
information will be shared with other users.”51
In February 2019, FamilyTreeDNA announced that they
too would allow law enforcement to submit crime scene DNA.
Unlike GEDMatch, however, FamilyTreeDNA requires law
enforcement to register all forensic samples and genetic files prior to
uploading to the FamilyTreeDNA database. This is consistent with
an interim policy issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in
September 2019, which now requires law enforcement to submit the
crime-scene derived profile explicitly on behalf of law enforcement,
and not under false pretenses.52 Permission to use
FamilyTreeDNA’s site for searching is only granted after the
required documentation is submitted, reviewed, and approved.
Permissible searches are limited to those identifying the remains of

Yuan et al., supra note 19, at 160.
See 23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME,
www.23andme.com/law-enforcement-guide (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) and
Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement, ANCESTRY,
www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/lawenforcement (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
49.
“Although you may provide a real name for registration and data
upload, you have the option of providing an alias for either login or data.” Terms
of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last
updated May 18, 2019).
50.
Id. (“When you upload Raw Data to GEDmatch, you agree that the
Raw Data is one of the following: Your DNA… DNA obtained and authorized
by law enforcement to either: (1) identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against
another individual… [or (2)] identify remains of a deceased individual.”).
51.
Cyrus Farivar, GEDmatch, a Tiny DNA Analysis Firm, Was Key for Golden
State Killer Case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2018/04/gedmatch-a-tiny-dna-analysis-firm-was-key-for-golden-statekiller-case.
52.
Interim Policy: Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching, supra
note 7.
47.
48.
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a deceased individual or a suspect in a homicide, sexual assault, or
trafficking case.53
In part because of these lax standards, law enforcement
agencies have been uploading genetic profiles increasingly quickly
to GEDMatch and FamilyTreeDNA to link unidentified criminals
with relatives. Profiles are constructed from samples of blood,
semen, or tissue found at the crime scene. Often there is insufficient
DNA available from the crime scene to develop a full SNP profile or
run multiple genetic tests.54 However, law enforcement’s ability to
extract whole-genome genotypes from degraded crime-scene
samples is improving.55 Further, if there is enough cellular material,
which is usually the case with semen from sexual assaults, law
enforcement can use SNP microarrays.56 The microarrays generate
dense genetic profiles indistinguishable from those developed by the
major DTC genetic testing companies.57
Because the identity of the person from whom the crimescene sample came is often unknown, law enforcement uses a false
name—“John Doe,” for example—and submits it to GEDMatch.
Then, when their “John Doe” matches someone in the database,
they use genealogical data to determine a common ancestor who
might be a great-great grandfather or grandmother. They then
triangulate other data, such as birth, voting, and military records, to
build out the pedigrees from that common ancestor, identifying all
of the potential individuals who may be suspects. As we each have
about 1,000 fourth cousins and 5,000 fifth cousins,58 depending on
the degree of relation, this process can be quite time-consuming.
The methodology is known by different names. In the forensic
genetics research community, it is referred to as “long-range familial
searches” (LRFS). Law enforcement sometimes refers to this as
Forensic Genetic Genealogy (FGG). This Article uses the term FGG.
The Golden State Killer, Joseph DeAngelo, was finally
arrested using the FGG technique after eluding California police for
Law Enforcement Guide, FAMILYTREEDNA,
https://www.familytreedna.com/legal/law-enforcement-guide (last visited Apr.
3, 2019).
54.
New developments in massively parallel sequencing may be one way of
getting more forensic data out of a limited amount of DNA in a sample. Denise
S. Court, Forensic Genealogy: Some Serious Concerns, 36 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L:
GENETICS 203, 203 (2018).
55.
See Paul Ellenbogen & Arvind Narayanan, Identification of Anonymous
DNA Using Genealogical Triangulation 5 (bioRxiv, Working Paper No. 531269,
2019).
56.
Court, supra note 54.
57.
Ellenbogen & Narayanan, supra note 55.
58.
Court, supra note 54.
53.
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decades. DeAngelo murdered at least 12 people and sexually
assaulted at least 45 women. Although law enforcement had
multiple samples of his DNA from crime scenes, his DNA did not
match any samples contained in the federal CODIS “offender”
DNA database.59 Until the advent of FGG, it seemed like the
identity of the Golden State Killer might never be known, and justice
for his many victims might never be delivered.
Once DeAngelo was finally arrested, questions regarding the
method of his identification began to surface. The police reluctantly
acknowledged that they used FGG, following the steps described
above.60 The profile derived from the crime scene matched someone
in GEDMatch—a distant cousin of the perpetrator. With the help
of genealogists, law enforcement found a common Italian ancestor
shared by the Golden State Killer and his distant relative.61 They
then built the family tree branch by branch to find people who were
about the right age and sex at the time of the crimes.62 They initially
tailed the wrong person, following him until he left some trash
behind that contained his DNA, which they tested against the crime
scene samples. It was not a match. They eliminated that individual
and kept looking for other possibilities. Eventually, they identified
Joseph DeAngelo. After analyzing DNA he also left on a piece of
trash, they had their suspect. It was a match. The former cop, now
in his early seventies, was finally arrested after evading law
enforcement for decades.
The Golden State Killer was one of several suspects
identified using FGG. Parabon® Nanolabs, Inc., a private company
that has commercialized FGG for law enforcement, reports that a
few dozen individuals have been arrested in this way.63 Recently,
another large forensic laboratory has entered the market.64 Two
decades after a man attacked ten women in their homes,
investigators used FGG to identify Roy Charles Waller as the serial
More will be said about the database that the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) maintains, CODIS, at p. 15. CODIS relies on a very
different type of genetic profile, based on short-tandem repeats at 20 locations in
the human genome that are not thought to code for traits. Because they are
thought not to be coding regions, individual variation in these STRs is quite
high, making them useful markers for differentiating individuals.
60.
Edge & Coop, supra note 41.
61.
Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found
His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018, 6:22 PM),
https://wapo.st/2HCvivq.
62.
See Guerrini, supra note 8, at *3.
63.
Parabon’s proprietary FDS methodology is called Snapshot Genetic
Genealogy. See Snapshot Genetic Genealogy, SNAPSHOT, https://snapshot.parabonnanolabs.com/genealogy (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
64.
Aldous, supra note 5.
59.
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rapist. Within five minutes of viewing the GEDMatch data, they
identified a close relative of the perpetrator. Because the individual
in the database was a close relative, the Sacramento police had a
suspect in under two hours, and Waller was quickly arrested.65
The head of Parabon’s genealogy department, CeCe Moore,
predicts that hundreds of crimes will be solved using FGG in the
coming years, assuming it continues to be legal.66 While the cost of
genotyping crime-scene DNA has dropped considerably, the
method remains quite costly due to the significant manpower
required to sift through archives to complete family pedigree charts.
Few GEDMatch users are close relatives of perpetrators, as was the
case in the Waller arrest. But when no other leads are available,
FGG may reopen a cold case.
D. How FGG Differs from CODIS
1. The Federal NDIS and CODIS Database Maintained by the
FBI
The DNA Identification Act of 1994 established the
National DNA Index System (NDIS), which stores the DNA profiles
contributed by federal, state, and local forensic laboratories.67 All 50
states, the District of Columbia, the federal government, the U.S.
Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, and Puerto Rico
contribute samples to the database.68 The Act limits the categories
of people whose profiles may be maintained in NDIS and details the
quality assurance, privacy, and expungement requirements for
participating laboratories. Once a match is identified by the CODIS
system, the laboratories involved in the match share information to
verify the match and identify the individual.69 The only information
contained in the CODIS database is an identifier of the contributing
agency, a unique specimen identification number, the laboratory
personnel associated with the analysis, and the “DNA profile.”70
Heather Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold
Case Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/science/gedmatch-genealogy-coldcases.html.
66.
Antonio Regolado, “Hundreds” of Crimes Will Soon Be Solved Using DNA
Databases, Genealogist Predicts, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 13, 2018),
www.technologyreview.com/s/612001/hundreds-of-crimes-will-soon-be-solvedusing-dna-databases-genealogist-predicts.
67.
Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometricanalysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
65.
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2. The Limited Value of CODIS STRs for Things Other Than
Identification
The DNA profile that CODIS employs is very different from
the profile used to apprehend the Golden State Killer. The CODIS
database uses short tandem repeats (STRs) to identify individuals.71
STRs, also known as microsatellites regions of DNA, are between
two and six nucleotides in length.72 For example, in one area, a string
of nucleotides such as “gata” might be repeated three times in one
person (gatagatagata), but thirteen times in another. These STRs
were chosen because they are polymorphic, meaning that there is
significant genomic diversity between individuals at these locations.
This yields more accurate matches, as it is very unlikely that
unrelated people would share the same number of repeats at these
loci.73 Forensic laboratory technicians create a genetic profile from
complete STRs that is thought to have a “vanishingly small,” but
not zero, probability of being shared with another person.74 The
STRs are in non-coding regions of the genome, so they are not
directly involved in coding for proteins.75 However, despite their
limited clinical usefulness, it is not accurate to label the STRs as
“junk DNA.”76
The 20 STRs are not known to contain health-related
information, making them much less useful for clinical research than
data from SNPs. However, ancestry information can be gleaned
from the CODIS markers.77 Because the locations of genes are not
random as once thought (a phenomenon called “linkage
disequilibrium”), CODIS markers can be used to predict some
health risks and identify genetic profiles from biobanks that match a
record in the CODIS database.78
Initially, the DNA Profile in CODIS only included STRs at
thirteen loci, but as of January 2017, the government gathers data
at 20 loci to achieve even higher confidence in matching.79 These
Daniel M. Bornman et al., Short-Read, High-Throughput Sequencing
Technology for STR Genotyping, BIOTECHNIQUES 1, 1 (2012).
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Susan Matheson, DNA Phenotyping: Snapshot of a Criminal, 166 CELL
1061, 1061 (2016).
75.
The thirteen junk loci, or non-coding alleles, are “stretches of DNA
that do not presently recognize traits and are not associated with any known
physical or medical characteristics.” Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 639
(2010).
76.
Algee-Hewitt et al., supra note 37; Edge & Coop, supra note 41.
77.
See Algee-Hewitt et al., supra note 37; Edge & Coop, supra note 41.
78.
See Algee-Hewitt et al., supra note 37; Edge & Coop, supra note 41.
79.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 67.
71.
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STR alleles are typically analyzed by amplifying the sample through
multiplexed polymerase chain reaction, followed by capillary
electrophoresis to separate segments.80 This technique is time and
cost-effective, but it does not allow for systematic genotyping of all
STR loci.
Because the CODIS database relies on STRs at only 20 noncoding loci, there is not enough genetic information to provide
matches to relatives beyond parents and siblings or to distinguish a
fourth cousin from an unrelated person.81 However, as most
consumer genetics tests reveal hundreds of thousands of SNPs,
identifying more distant relatives becomes possible—third cousins
can usually be found, and many fourth cousins can be as well.82
Because DOJ laboratories do not analyze SNPs during their forensic
DNA casework, if they were to use this sort of analysis, it would need
to be completed through an outside vendor laboratory.83
Even with SNP data, predicting an exact relationship based on
shared DNA alone is not always possible, with the exception of
identical-twin, parent-child, or full-sibling matches. There are
certain relationships that produce similar patterns of shared DNA to
each other. For example, a woman who shares 1750 centiMorgans
(cMs) of DNA with you could be your half-sister, grandmother,
granddaughter, or aunt. Likewise, a first cousin, grandchild, or a
great-uncle/aunt/nephew/niece could all share roughly 950 cMs of
DNA.84 To predict the type of relationship, other sources of data
such as age and death records would need to be used.
3. Familial Searching in CODIS Is of Limited Utility and
Requires Additional Oversight
The FBI has discouraged law enforcement from using
CODIS to identify partial STR matches. Partial matches occur
when no one in the CODIS database matches the crime scene DNA
at all 20 loci, but someone in the database matches at perhaps eight
or so, indicating they probably are a sibling or parent of the person
whose identity law enforcement is trying to determine. So-called
“familial searching” in CODIS has been quite controversial, in part
because this method produces a high rate of false positives. Also, like
FGG, it identifies individuals by their association with people in the
offender database, and not because they themselves chose to add
Bornman et al., supra note 71.
Edge & Coop, supra note 37, at 2-3.
82.
Id.
83.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52.
84.
The Limits of Predicting Relationships Using DNA, THE DNA GEEK (Dec.
19, 2016), https://thednageek.com/the-limits-of-predicting-relationships-usingdna.
80.
81.
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their DNA.85 Conducting these familial searches under CODIS
requires greater regulatory oversight, and is limited to “the most
serious cases.”86 Because familial searches can be unreliable, many
states, such as Colorado, have created a committee that determines
when a familial match is suggestive enough to disclose it to local
investigators. Some have argued that the additional layers of
oversight for CODIS-mediated familial matches should also be
required for FGG. Erin Murphy, a Professor of Law at New York
University, for example, supports the separation between the local
police and the state committee overseeing familial searches to
“ensure that incidental findings, such as adoption or non-paternity,
are distanced from those in close contact with the family.” 87
However, in practice, there is often no investigative reason to
disclose such information to relatives, and policies discouraging such
disclosure are reasonable.
Law enforcement’s use of private databases to identify
criminals is viewed by some as an “alarming end-run”88 around
forensic databases like CODIS, given that CODIS has many more
technical requirements for registering samples, conducting searches,
and returning the results to investigating agencies.89 This argument
is misleading. In practice, law enforcement turns to DTC genetic
databases only when CODIS does not result in a match, consistent
with the recent interim policy on FGG issued by the DOJ. More
importantly, FGG differs from CODIS in ways that makes it more
permissible and less intrusive, and thus not an “end-run” at all. FGG
might be avoiding some of the limitations on CODIS, but the
limitations are not required outside of CODIS because of the way
the comparison samples are obtained. The procedure does not
require that the government obtains samples involuntarily from

85.
“[F]amilial searches should be forbidden because they embody the
very presumptions that our constitutional and evidentiary rules have long
endeavored to counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimination, propensity,
and even biological determinism.” Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of
DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 304 (2010); see also Natalie Ram, The
Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
182, 185 (2009).
86.
Erin Murphy, Law and Policy Oversight of Familial Searches In Recreational
Genealogy Databases, 292 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e5, e6 (2018).
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at e7.
89.
“Thus, although corporations and individual citizens generate the
largest storehouses of personal data today, the government—through its
subpoena powers, contractual agreements, and public access to online data—
can effectively bootstrap private information into its own domain without
contending with the Constitution.” Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and
the Constitution, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 409, 410 (2014).
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individuals. With FGG, the government merely accesses a public
genealogical database, albeit for forensic purposes.
a. The Data from DTC Genetic Databases Do Not Overlap with
CODIS
The power of the FGG method lies in the sheer number of
people who have contributed samples for DTC genetic tests. Data
analysts project that a genetic database only needs to cover
approximately 2% of the target population to “provide a thirdcousin match to nearly any person.”90 Therefore, using population
models that assume no inbreeding and random sampling of
participants, researchers “predict that with a database size of ~3
million U.S. individuals of European descent…more than 99% of
the people of [European] ancestry would have at least a single thirdcousin match and more than 65% are expected to have at least one
second-cousin match.”91 As the popularity of GEDMatch rises, and
with FamilyTreeDNA announcing that they will allow forensic
searching of their database, achieving this 2% target is within reach.
With a warrant or subpoena, law enforcement could search
23andMe or Ancestry, which together already have tens of millions
of users.92
b. FGG Uses Dense SNP Data, Which Contain Information
about Disease Risk, Ancestry, and Physical Traits
Many of the panels that DTC companies employ are based
on genome-wide association studies (GWAS) from thousands of
unrelated individuals. Researchers look for point mutations on
thousands of alleles and correlate them with disease risk. GWAS
studies have transformed human genetics, with the discovery of
thousands of mutations that are associated with increased (and in
some cases decreased) risk of developing certain diseases. However,
as members of the tested population likely have widely varying
lifestyles and exposure to different environmental risks, the
predictive effects for complex diseases are often small and in need of
90.
Erlich et al., supra note 4. Others predict that with as little as 1% of the
population genotyped with dense SNP data, accurate identification is possible in
the “median” case. See Ellenbogen & Narayanan, supra note 55.
91.
Erlich et al., supra note 4.
92.
Ancestry.com’s website states that AncestryDNA was “[l]aunched in
May 2012, [and it] has more than 10 million people in its consumer DNA
network, making it the largest in the world.” Ancestry Company Facts, ANCESTRY,
www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts (last visited Nov.
18, 2019). From 23andMe’s website, it states that “23andMe has more than
5,000,000 customers.” About Us, 23ANDME,
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us (last visited Nov. 18,
2019).
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updating.93 Even so, GWAS studies have the unusual scientific
feature of being highly reproducible.94 The ability to make diseaserisk predictions from GWAS studies makes the data from the SNP
microarrays, specifically those used by law enforcement in FGG,
much more rich and sensitive. 95
c. FGG Corrects the Racial Bias Inherent in the CODIS
Database
There is another important way in which the genealogical
databases differ from CODIS. The CODIS database is racially
biased, due to its significant over-sampling of African Americans. 96
At least 40% of CODIS is comprised of African Americans, making
it much more likely that they, and their family members, will be
implicated in a crime through a profile in CODIS. Familial partial
match searches would render about 17% of the African American
population identifiable, as compared to just 4% of the Caucasian
population, despite much lower base rates of African Americans in
the general population.97
In contrast to CODIS, the consumer genomics databases are
much more likely to represent individuals from Northern Europe,
thus providing matches for the mostly Caucasian population.98
Thus, the racial bias of the databases goes in opposite directions,
with CODIS oversampling people of color, especially African
Americans, and consumer genomics oversampling Caucasians from
Northern Europe. Because the consumer genomics databases do not
overlap significantly with samples gathered pursuant to CODIS
regulations, they provide a rich source of leads for many more
suspects who are not of African American descent.

The predictive ability of risk evaluation from GWAS studies “depends
on the number and effect size of the loci associated with the probability of
developing a given phenotype, and has to date been found to generally be
modest for most multifactorial conditions.” Joel Krier et al., Reclassification of
Genetic-Based Risk Predictions as GWAS Data Accumulate, 8 GENOME MED. 1, 2
(2016).
94.
Urko Merigorta, Replicability and Prediction: Lessons and Challenges
from GWAS, 34 TRENDS IN GENETICS 504, 504 (2018).
95.
Murphy, supra note 86, at e5.
96.
Curtis, supra note 29, at 2; see also Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties:
The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
248, 258-259 (2006) (noting that African American suspects are four to five times
more likely to be identified through CODIS searches than white Americans).
97.
Greely et al., supra note 96, at 259.
98.
Yuan, supra note 19, at 162-163.
93.
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E. FGG Does Not Require a Warrant
1. FGG Is Not a Return to the Abhorrent General Warrant
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting
unreasonable searches of people or their property.99 The Framers of
the Constitution sought to prevent the abhorrent royal practice of
general warrants, where the government could harass people by
“ransack[ing] one’s personal belongings” to find evidence for a
prosecution.100 Is FGG a return to the general warrant, as it gives
police the power to conduct “fishing expeditions” of innocent distant
relatives of criminals in non-forensic databases? There is obvious
appeal to this sort of thinking. The idea of a surveillance state that
can search innocent people to solve crimes offends our deeply-held
notions of liberty and privacy. However, there is a very important
distinction between the historical practice of general warrants and
the use of FGG that shows just how unlike the general warrant FGG
truly is.
Before the government may search a person or place in a
way that could pose an unreasonable risk to their privacy, they must
first obtain a warrant from a judge or magistrate based upon
probable cause.101 The officer applying for a warrant must describe
with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. Warrants thus limit the scope of searches and prevent
boundless ransacking. Any evidence, or the fruits of that evidence,
unconstitutionally seized from that defendant and thus obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures is inadmissible.102
No search occurs unless the individual “manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the searched object, and society
is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”103 Following
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (“The American
colonists echoed this reasoning in their ‘widespread hostility’ to the Crown's
writs of assistance—a practice that inspired the Revolution and became ‘[t]he
driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment.’”) (internal
citation omitted; alterations in original).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969).
103. Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (internal quotations
omitted). This formulation comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). (“My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
99.

100.
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this, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public.”104 Relatedly, a warrant is not required in many cases
where someone voluntarily shares their otherwise private
information with third parties. Under the “third-party doctrine,” it
is presumed that making a deliberate choice to share information
waives the individual’s privacy interest in the once-private
information.105 However, what one “seeks to preserve as private,”
even in public, may justify constitutional protection.106
2. For Fourth Amendment Purposes, Discarded DNA Has
Regrettably Been Analogized to Trash
The Supreme Court followed the principles laid out in the previous
section in California v. Greenwood, where it stated that “society would
not accept as reasonable [a] claim to an expectation of privacy in
trash left for collection in an area accessible to the public.”107 This
case proved to be very beneficial to law enforcement, particularly
with regard to surreptitiously obtaining DNA to test against crime
scene samples. Many state courts have analogized to Greenwood to
permit the collection of genetic samples from discarded water

second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’ Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of
outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited.”). The simplicity of the language belies how fraught its
interpretation has become. Fourth Amendment scholar Orrin Kerr has argued
that “[a]lthough the courts speak of a single ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
test, the one label masks several distinct but coexisting approaches. Four
approaches predominate, together reflecting four different models of Fourth
Amendment protection.” Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection,
60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2007). Kerr argues that only one of the four
descriptive models, “the probabilistic model,” is actually concerned with the
privacy expectations of ordinary citizens. Id. Other scholars, on the other hand,
argue that each of Kerr’s four models boil down to an evaluation of
intrusiveness. See Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age,
Bias, and Technology, 106 CAL. L. REV. 263, 277–78 (2018); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1603-04 (2010).
104. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Kevin J. Schrop, Your Cooperation is Greatly
Appreciated: The Fourth Amendment, National Security Letters, and Public-Private Data
Sharing, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 849, 857–58 (2018).
105. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (2018); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
106. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
107. 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988).
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bottles, gum, and sealed envelopes.108 The theory is that the DNA
on the trash is also trash, and is knowingly shared with third parties.
This analysis strains credulity given a) how little most people know
about the feasibility of pulling a genetic profile from their water
bottles or chewing gum; b) the vast amounts of private, immutable
information contained in that DNA profile, containing secrets that
are still being unlocked; and c) our inability to refrain from shedding
DNA on personal items we must eventually discard (unless we create
a public health disaster by never recycling anything or disposing of
our trash). It is indefensible to suggest that someone loses their
subjective expectation of privacy in their genetic material by leaving
a soda can in the trash or in a public recycling bin. Nevertheless,
many state courts have made precisely these claims, relying on
analogies to trash from Greenwood.109
Raynor v. Maryland provides a particularly alarming example
of how states may treat “discarded” DNA.110 In Raynor, the
defendant had agreed to be questioned in police custody in
connection with a rape investigation.111 Detectives asked him to
provide a DNA sample, and he refused. While he was sitting in the
chair, they noticed that he kept scratching his bare arms. They
Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 865 (2006) (“With abandoned DNA,
existing Fourth Amendment law appears not to apply at all. It may be that an
individual harbors an actual expectation of privacy in his genetic information.
The few reported cases involving abandoned DNA have followed Greenwood's
analysis, though, and have concluded that there is no objective expectation of
privacy in saliva—and the DNA contained within it--that is left behind on a
coffee cup or on a smoked cigarette.”).
109. For example, in Commonwealth v. Ewing, the police gave the defendant—
then the suspect—a meal, soft drink, straw, and cigarettes during questioning at
a police station. 85 N.E.2d 993,1000 (Mass. App. Court. 2006), aff'd, 873 N.E.2d
1150 (Mem) (Mass. 2007). The police took some of the defendant’s discarded
items to the crime lab for DNA testing, where DNA on the cigarette butt
matched that found in the rape kit. Id. at 1001. The defendant moved to
suppress the DNA test. Id. at 1000. The court held that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy to the cigarette butt he discarded, as he
voluntarily abandoned it as trash. Id. at 1001. Regardless of whether the police
conduct was a ruse, police are allowed to conduct “ruses” so long as there is not
coercion. Here, the defendant was offered a meal, which he accepted. “Under
the circumstances, the ruse, if it was one, was proper.” Id. New Hampshire, by
contrast, has opted to protect individual privacy to a greater extent under its
state constitution, rejecting the idea that individuals relinquish their expectation
of privacy in the trash they discard for municipal collection. State v. Goss, 834
A.2d 316, 319 (N.H. 2003) (“We conclude that the defendant exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy in his trash because he placed it in black plastic
bags with the expectation it would be picked up by authorized persons for
eventual disposal. We also conclude that society is prepared to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.”).
110. Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014).
111. Id.
108.
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figured he might have shed some skin cells. After he left the room,
detectives obtained his genetic material from his chair, tested it to
develop a genetic profile, and compared the genetic profile to that
of DNA obtained from the crime scene.112 The Maryland Court of
Appeals held that law enforcement’s “analysis of the 13 identifying
loci within [defendant’s] DNA left behind on the chair at the police
station, in order to determine a match with the DNA the police
collected from the scene of the rape, was not a search” under the
Fourth Amendment.113 The basis for these sorts of opinions (i.e., the
idea that one loses her subjective expectation of privacy when she
leaves articles in the trash) has become increasingly vulnerable. The
doctrine appears to be on thin ice.114
3. Consumers Who Upload Genetic Profiles to Open-Access
Genetic Websites Lose Their Subjective Expectation of Privacy
In the recent Fourth Amendment case of Carpenter v. United
States, the majority opinion recognized that the type and volume of
information, as well as the manner in which it is shared with third
parties, should be relevant to our actual subjective expectation of
privacy.115 It may no longer be enough that the information is
technically “shared” by placing it somewhere others can access.
Indeed, the Carpenter majority recognized a “world of difference”
between the limited information collected by telephone companies
when users dial a landline telephone number and the “exhaustive
chronicle” of cellphone-site location information that is “casually”
shared by subscribers.116 The court noted that just as cell-site
tracking information is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled … generat[ing] increasingly vast amounts of increasingly
precise [data],” the very same could be said for genetic information
gathered through shed DNA.117 The methods for determining
ancestry, health, and familial information from our genomes are
becoming much more precise, cheap, and predictive. At the same
time, the donor of the DNA sample has done nothing deliberate to
share her DNA with law enforcement. DNA collection may be as
casual as picking up a coffee cup that someone throws away in the
trash and swabbing it.

Id. at 756.
Id. at 759.
114. See Erin Cooper, Comment, Following in the European Union's Footsteps:
Why the United States Should Adopt Its Own “Right to Be Forgotten” Law for Crime
Victims, 32 JOHN MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L., 2015, 185, 195–96.
115. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018).
116. Id. at 2219.
117. Id. at 2212, 2217.
112.
113.
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Further, the Court reminded us that the “nature” of the
information sought matters for the third-party doctrine as well.118
Each week, scientists discover new information that is embedded in
our genome. While predictions are imperfect given varying genetic
penetrance (i.e., the likelihood the phenotype will develop from the
genotype) and expression (i.e., the degree to which the phenotype,
once it develops, is expressed), there are thousands of highly
penetrant disease risks that we can gather from our genes.119 And we
cannot change the genes we are born with—at least not yet. Genetic
information is, therefore, much more sensitive and in need of
privacy protection than are cell-site location records. Thus, if the
Court were asked to determine whether the analysis of discarded
DNA constitutes an unreasonable search under Carpenter, the
outcome might be very different today than it would have been
under Greenwood. Indeed, even the dissents in Carpenter made plain
their disfavor for Greenwood, with Justice Gorsuch excoriating it as
one of the many “unbelievable” results of the “unpredictable” Katz
test.120 In rejecting the idea that people lose their subjective
expectation of privacy when they discard trash, Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent suggests that the Greenwood majority canvassed the “habits of
raccoons” rather than the “habits of the country.”121
However, there is an essential difference between cell-site
location tracking, searching involuntarily discarded DNA, and
voluntary uploading of genetic information to sites like GEDMatch
or FamilyTreeDNA. Namely, the act of sharing is much more active
and deliberate in the latter case. In holding that law enforcement
required a warrant before they could obtain cell-site location data
from wireless companies, the majority in Carpenter questioned
whether cell-site tracking information is truly voluntarily shared
consistent with the third-party doctrine.122 For one, cellphones are
“such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one is
nearly obligatory in modern society.123 The Court reasoned it would
be a huge inconvenience to ask someone to abstain from using a
cellphone in order to protect their geographic expectations of
privacy. This argument is even stronger when thinking about
whether we voluntarily discard our DNA through skin cells or hair.
We cannot opt out of possessing or shedding our DNA. It would

Id. at 2216.
Caroline F. Wright et al., Assessing the Pathogenicity, Penetrance, and
Expressivity of Putative Disease-Causing Variants in a Population Setting, 104 AM. J.
HUMAN GENETICS 275, 275 (2019).
120. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2220.
123. Id.
118.
119.
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require substantial and unreasonable efforts to scrub all of our
discarded hair, fingernails, or skin cells.124
However, we can opt out of participating in genetic
genealogical services, and we can certainly avoid exposing our
genetic information to strangers on open-source websites. The
people who have uploaded their SNP profiles to GEDMatch or
FamilyTreeDNA might not fully appreciate the massive amounts of
information they are sharing. However, they are sharing this
information affirmatively, and voluntarily, through a website for
genealogical hobbyists. So far, this is all that the third-party doctrine
requires. Unlike cell-site tracking, which occurs “without any
affirmative act on the user's part beyond powering up,”125 uploading
a genetic profile to a website like GEDMatch requires several
deliberate and voluntary steps. If the Court continues to pursue
doctrine like that in Carpenter, the truly voluntary sharing of
profiles—by providing a saliva sample, receiving genetic results,
downloading them in plain-text format from 23andMe, registering
one’s name or alias at a separate site, and finally uploading one’s
data to that site—would easily distinguish cell-site tracking from
FGG.
4. FGG is Analogous to the Warrantless Searching of PubliclyAccessible Peer-to-Peer Networks to Prosecute Child Rape
Cases involving the prosecution of people who disseminate
child pornography (which is a euphemism for child rape) may be
instructive in predicting how the doctrine might apply to
investigations that use FGG. Law enforcement commonly identifies
violations of child pornography laws by searching for digital
signatures (SHA-1) on files that are known to contain pornographic
images of children.126 When perpetrators download or share these
files on peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella or Limewire, they can
be traced through their digital signatures. Investigators use
something called the “Wyoming Toolkit” to scan Gnutella and

124. Thus, it does seem that the Supreme Court should evaluate the cases
using Greenwood to analogize DNA to trash and should reconsider whether a
warrant ought to be required before a presumptively innocent individual has
their DNA obtained from a discarded coffee cup or door handle.
125. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
126. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., 2 Search and Seizure § 51.01 (5th ed. 2019)
LexisNexis; see also, e.g., New Technology Fights Child Porn by Tracking Its “PhotoDNA,”
MICROSOFT
NEWS
(Dec.
15,
2009), https://news.microsoft.com/2009/12/15/new-technology-fights-childporn-by-tracking-its-photodna.
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Limewire for profiles sharing illicit content.127 The Wyoming
Toolkit is a computer program and database that automatically
identifies and labels child pornography shared over the Internet
through peer-to-peer file sharing networks.128
Those prosecuted for owning or distributing child
pornography have argued that the use of the Wyoming Toolkit
without a warrant constitutes an unconstitutional search under the
Fourth Amendment. Some have even analogized to the thermal
image scanning at issue in Kyllo v. United States129 to argue that
searching the reference dataset against the peer-to-peer networks
violated reasonable expectations of privacy.130 State and federal
courts have considered this issue and “none [have] found an
expectation of privacy” in the files that are retrieved from one’s
personal computer that one has uploaded to a publicly accessible,
peer-to-peer network.131 As such, there has been no search. Even
highly sensitive information, the possession of which is a strict
liability crime, may be deemed “no longer private” when shared
through a third-party website. This is the case even where the users
would need to search for this content using specific codes like
“PTHC” (which represents the phrase “preteen hardcore”).132
It is a simple step to move from these cases to an easy defense
of FGG. Even if the genetic information uploaded is something
meant to be kept private due to its sensitive nature, one loses the
expectation of privacy when uploading this data from a private
computer to a peer-to-peer sharing site like GEDMatch.
5. There Are No Vicarious Rights Under the Fourth Amendment
Even if the Court were prepared to require a warrant for
searching sites like GEDMatch, there would be other obstacles to
vindicating any Fourth Amendment rights. The remedy for a Fourth
Amendment violation is the exclusion, in an eventual criminal trial,
of any evidence that was improperly obtained as a result of the

Jay Shapiro, Obtaining and Suppressing Identification, 1 THE PROSECUTION
§ 21.03 (2019), LexisNexis.
128. State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 1, 345 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Utah 2015).
129. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
130. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 25, 345 P.3d at 1231.
131. Id. (collecting cases). See also United States v. Hill, 750 F.3d 982, 986
(8th Cir. 2014) (“[A] defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
files…retrieved from his personal computer where [the defendant] admittedly
installed and used LimeWire to make his files accessible to others for file
sharing.”) (internal quotations omitted).
132. United States v. Driver, No. 11-20219, 2012 WL 1605975, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. May 8, 2012).
127.

AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES
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unconstitutional search.133 Because this is the remedy, the right only
inheres to criminal defendants for unconstitutional searches of their
person or things. Thus, even co-conspirators who were “aggrieved
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence” cannot assert a
Fourth Amendment claim unless they either owned or had an
expectation of privacy in what was searched.134
As applied to FGG, this means that the innocent relatives
whose genetic profiles were searched through GEDMatch would
certainly have no “standing” to bring a Fourth Amendment
claim.135 While the Supreme Court has referred to this as
“standing,” that term is not quite right. This requirement is neither
jurisdictional nor rooted in Article III of the Constitution, but rather
“is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment
doctrine.”136 Essentially, because there is no remedy for the nondefendants whose data were searched, there is no Fourth
Amendment right that is violated.137 This also means that the
Golden State Killer, and other defendants like him, cannot borrow
the Fourth Amendment violations of others and assert them by
proxy. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which “may not
be vicariously asserted.”138
a. FGG Is Unlikely to Provide Basis for a Relative’s Invasion of
Privacy Claim

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963).
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1969).
135. “[T]here is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here,
the defendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search
and seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and
(c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the
offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested
search and seizure.” Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1973).
136. United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2014).
137. As Shima Baradaran-Baughman aptly notes, this sort of analysis is
flawed, as courts focus on the personal rights of the criminal defendant who
often do not have “clean hands.” Instead, courts should balance the rights not
just of the criminal defendant ex post, but also of society ex ante, presuming that
the search is of an innocent individual. The rights-holder “represents the rights
of all of society, yet the information before the court often relates only to the
individual defendant.” Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102
GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2013). However, even if courts were prepared to balance the
privacy interests of all of society, ex ante, it does not work as well in this context.
When a search for a match with crime-scene DNA is conducted, the DNA
donor is still innocent until proven guilty. Nonetheless, he has a huge evidentiary
hurdle to overcome, given that his semen or blood was found at the crime scene;
this no doubt skews the privacy analysis to the DNA and its donor, whose hands
are “dirty.” See Bernard Chao et al., supra note 103, at 281–82.
138. See Brown, 411 U.S. at 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 389 (1968).
133.
134.
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A criminal suspect’s relative, who presumably uploaded her
profile to GEDMatch, could theoretically try to assert a civil claim
for invasion of privacy against law enforcement.139 It could be a
regular tort suit, if she could overcome governmental immunity.140
Or, it could be a federal statutory claim, if she could assert that law
enforcement acted under the color of state law when violating her
civil rights.141 However, if she was indeed the person who uploaded
or “published” her own genetic profile, she would have no recourse
for public disclosure of private facts or any other conceivable privacy
actions.142 The plaintiff must maintain an expectation of privacy in
the information that is disclosed or the database that is surveilled to
prevail on any of the relevant privacy torts.143 Evidence that the
plaintiff voluntarily submitted the once-private information to a
publicly available database would render her privacy claims moot.
If, however, someone else submitted her profile on her behalf and
without her consent, there could be a privacy tort against that
individual. While the amount of saliva required by 23andMe (about
a teaspoon) makes it difficult to obtain a sample without the
individual’s compliance, it is currently possible for parents to submit
samples on behalf of their children, Other DTC companies only
require a cheek swab.144 One genealogical message board even
provides guidance for how to force an elderly person to submit a
sample, by “adding a small amount of sugar to the tip of the
tongue.”145 The criminal whose DNA was uploaded by law
enforcement under an alias, however, would not have a cause of
action in tort, as courts have uniformly concluded that criminals
have no reasonable expectations of privacy in the DNA they leave
at crime scenes.146
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
140. “In some jurisdictions, sovereign immunity prohibits an individual
from suing the state for invasion of privacy. In other jurisdictions, sovereign
immunity imposes no such bar because it has been waived via the state's
applicable tort claims act.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98
CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2016–17 (2010).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019).
142. 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 159 (Originally published in 2008).
143. See Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 702–03 (Tex. App. 1993).
144. Providing Saliva Sample for DNA Test Kit, 23ANDME,
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904530-ProvidingSaliva-Sample-for-DNA-Test-Kit (last visited Nov. 18, 2019); Who Can Use the
23andMe Kit, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/enus/articles/202904520-Who-can-use-the-23andMe-kit.
145. Genealogy and Family History Beta, Comment to How to Get an Elderly
Person to Provide Saliva Sample for DNA?, STACKEXCHANGE,
https://genealogy.stackexchange.com/questions/12177/how-to-get-an-elderlyperson-to-provide-saliva-sample-for-dna.
146. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Current Controversies in the Use of DNA in Forensic
Investigations, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 39, 61 (2018).
139.
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Opponents of FGG argue that the practice violates both the
rights of the criminal defendant and the rights of the family member
who contributed her genetic profile to GEDMatch. Understanding
who holds the right proves to be critical for Fourth Amendment
analysis. The distant relative has no Fourth Amendment claim if she
is not prosecuted for a crime based on that DNA evidence. Likewise,
the criminal defendant has no Fourth Amendment claim if the
uploaded DNA comes from the crime scene and law enforcement
uses it solely to identify the perpetrator.
F. Debunking the Common Privacy Critiques of FGG
Many critics of FGG now acknowledge that it does not
violate current understandings of the Fourth Amendment.147 Even
if the search through FGG passes constitutional muster, however,
many argue that the methodology is too intrusive into the lives and
genomes of innocent people, because it (1) improperly renders
distant family members “unintentional informants,” (2) improperly
encourages deceptive investigative methods by law enforcement,
and (3) is a de facto and impermissible universal database. I will
address each of these concerns in turn. After much consideration, I
conclude that each concern is based on some form of genetic
essentialism. There are many traditional non-genetics cases, which
involve methodologies similar to FGG in important ways, that do
not give rise to any legal claims and are in fact generally considered
appropriate searches or disclosures. The privacy alarms that many
critics of FGG have sounded seem to reflect a misunderstanding of
how traditional criminal cases are investigated, when privacy rights
are violated, and how ordinary testimony is obtained.
1. Being Precise About the Actual Privacy Costs
In general, many of the public responses to the apprehension
of the Golden State Killer questioned whether the cost to privacy
was just too high to justify the use of FGG. One ethicist recognized
that the killer “was a horrible man and it is good that he was
identified,” but wondered whether “the end justif[ied] the means?”
148 Others echoed these sentiments, noting the “tendency in such

147. Ram, supra note 12 (“Current Fourth Amendment precedent,
meanwhile, is unlikely to bar warrantless police searches of genealogical DNA
databases.”).
148. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked
Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018),
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cases to minimize the privacy costs because the gains are so great.”
In the popular press, FGG has been described as alternatively
“creepy”150 and “dystopian.”151 The sponsor of a bill in the
Maryland legislature to ban the use of FGG expressed his concerns
this way: “If the state doesn’t want law enforcement searching
databases full of its criminals, why would it allow the same kind of
search conducted on citizens who haven’t committed any
crimes?”152

149

But what exactly are the privacy costs? Initially, it seems
horribly offensive that the government could use a family member’s
DNA to track down a distantly related criminal. But why, exactly?
After all, when law enforcement exploited GEDMatch to apprehend
the Golden State Killer, the database was used to do precisely what
it was designed to do—reduce the anonymity of users and connect
them with their distant relatives. Of course, law enforcement’s use
of the database was probably not contemplated by its users, and
submitting a crime scene-derived sample through an alias requires
deceit. But GEDMatch (and now FamilyTreeDNA) users seek
information about relatives of whom they have no knowledge. If
these services only confirmed the names and identities of close
relatives whose identities and personal histories were known, they
would offer nothing of value. Importantly, law enforcement
ostensibly only use the profile to find people who shared a common
ancestor with the perpetrator, and do not compare any other SNP
information. They simply use the database to connect the user with
crime scene DNA.
From the perspective of the users, they have to expect and
be open to the idea that uncovering their pedigree could reveal
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killergenealogy.html.
149. Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supreme-court-rewrite-rules-dnasearches.
150. Megan Molteni, The Creepy Genetics Behind the Golden State Killer Case,
WIRED (Apr. 27, 2019), www.wired.com/story/detectives-cracked-the-goldenstate-killer-case-using-genetics.
151. Avi Selk, The Ingenious and 'Dystopian' DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt
the 'Golden State Killer' Suspect, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2018),
www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fnews%2ftruecrime%2fwp%2f2018%2f04%2f27%2fgolden-state-killer-dna-websitegedmatch-was-used-to-identify-joseph-deangelo-as-suspect-policesay%2f%3futm_source%3dreddit.com&utm_source=reddit.com&utm_term=.6
3486f10d5a4.
152. Megan Molteni, Should Cops Use Family Tree Forensics? Maryland Isn’t So
Sure, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2019), www.wired.com/story/maryland-considersbanning-genetic-genealogy-forensics.
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unpleasant information about their relatives or their past. Indeed,
learning that you are a distant relative of a serial killer is probably
much less traumatic than discovering that your biological parents
are not who you thought they were, or that you were conceived by
rape or incest.153 These sorts of revelations seem much more likely
to be unexpected or surprising, and yet are known to occur through
many forms of DTC genetic testing. The possibility for learning this
type of information does not stop DTC genetic testing in its tracks,
so we cannot be worried about the revelation of disturbing
information from our pedigrees. Indeed, there is no indication that
the relatives in the Golden State Killer case were even informed that
it was their SNP data that led to the arrest.
The privacy concerns in the Golden State Killer case cannot
simply be that a GEDMatch user discovered unpleasant information
about a distant relative, as that is part of the service that 23andMe
and Ancestry offer. What must be troubling, then, is the
government’s involvement in their discovery. But the government is
not forcing innocent people to upload their genetic profiles to the
internet. They are merely providing those already desirous of a more
complete family tree with an even more complete family tree—that
is, if they even tell the user about the connection with the crimescene DNA. In many cases, there is no reason for law enforcement
to reveal pedigree information with the relatives whose genetic
profiles were used to find a common ancestor, unless they want to
ask them questions about their relatives to narrow the pool of
suspects. Once they have the pedigree information from a site like
GEDMatch, they could presumably delete the fake account created
from the crime-scene DNA.
The critics of FGG shift from critiquing the government’s
search, to critiquing the criminal’s involuntary submission of his
DNA, to critiquing the GEDMatch user’s uploading of their DNA,
which implicates their family members in crime. While all of these
are valid potential privacy violations, in order to assert them, critics
need to be a bit sloppy about what exactly the FGG technology
entails. When we focus on precisely what is being searched and
whose privacy interests are at stake, the privacy concerns about
FGG largely disappear. Much of this disagreement about what to
Sarah Zhang, When a DNA Test Shatters Your Identity, THE ATLANTIC
(July 17, 2018), www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/dna-testmisattributed-paternity/562928 (“But not all biological parents want to be
found. In conversations and correspondence with more than two dozen people
for this story, I heard of DNA tests that unearthed affairs, secret pregnancies,
quietly buried incidents of rape and incest, and fertility doctors using their own
sperm to inseminate patients. These secrets otherwise would have—or even
did—go the grave.”).
153.
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focus on stems from confusing the pedigree with the underlying
DNA that predicted it and from confusing a presumptively innocent
individual with the donor of crime-scene DNA. While the donor of
crime-scene DNA, obtained through a rape kit, is still innocent until
proven guilty, he will often have to use a mens rea defense rather than
being able to refute the actus reus. For this and other reasons,
criminals have few privacy rights in crime-scene DNA, which is what
is used to search GEDMatch. This next section aims to sharpen our
focus of what exactly is being searched, disclosed, and violated when
law enforcement uses FGG.
2. Defendants Who Are Prosecuted Through FGG Did Not
Volunteer to Have Their Samples Contributed
The first big problem with FGG, according to opponents, is
that those arrested following a search of GEDMatch or
FamilyTreeDNA did not volunteer to have their DNA included in
those databases. Further, the users of GEDMatch also did not
“specifically and knowingly consent to the use of their genealogical
data by law enforcement.”154 Of course, before these sites updated
their terms of use, those uploading their data to GEDMatch did not
give explicit consent to its particular use by police. But that is
somewhat irrelevant. They gave blanket consent to all potential uses,
by virtue of uploading their data to a public access site. Just as I
consent to all uses of my videos when I upload them without
conditions to YouTube or Facebook, I cannot later claim a privacy
violation if someone used my public video in a way I had not
specifically contemplated. The same is true in this context. The fact
that users did not provide specific consent to a particular use is
immaterial, given that they consented to all uses.
One team of researchers went so far as to call law
enforcement’s methods “unethical,” as they “bypassed the codes of
informed consent.”155 Informed consent in the medical context
requires that a patient understands what is being done to her before
she agrees to be touched by a physician or researcher. Failure to
provide informed consent could result in battery or medical
malpractice liability. The concept of the defendant’s consent is
under-theorized in criminal law. Detectives ought to do better to
make sure that defendants actually consent to procedures that
require it. But let me be clear: prosecutors will never be required to
obtain “informed consent” before accessing a suspect’s data, nor
should they be.

154.
155.

Curtis et al., supra note 29, at 1483.
Court, supra note 55.
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The reasons for informed consent in the medical world have
to do with the trust that patients place in their physicians, the need
to make sure that their autonomy is respected, and the need to
protect them from unnecessary harm.156 Informed consent also
recognizes the inherent power and information imbalance between
the patient and the physician.157 The concern is that the baseline
relationship is paternalistic, since a patient might just go along with
whatever the skilled physicians suggests. Given the trust that
consumers place in the DTC companies and labs that process
sensitive, health-related information, some researchers have sensibly
argued for informed consent for DTC genetic testing.158 I discuss
this below in Part I.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, have a very different sort of
relationship to the perpetrators of crime, which is inherently
adversarial and not based on trust. The power and information
imbalance swings in the opposite direction, at least at the beginning
of an investigation where the perpetrator holds all of the cards. At
this point, it is the prosecution that is playing catch-up. Given that it
is crime-scene DNA that is being analyzed under FGG, and not a
search of a presumptively innocent individual, the donor of the crimescene DNA sits in a very different posture than a disempowered and
autonomy-seeking patient. There is simply no reason to afford him
the kind of arms-length respect for autonomy that clinical informed
consent necessitates.
True, the suspect has never been arrested or convicted of a
violent crime, which would have placed his DNA in CODIS. But
that hardly means that “the identification of individuals who are not
directly included in a genetic database runs afoul of any given reason
law enforcement use of such databases is legally and ethically

“The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the medical
sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity. The second is that a person
of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his
own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.
The third is that the patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be
an informed consent. And the fourth is that the patient, being unlearned in
medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and trust in his physician for the
information upon which he relies during the decisional process, thus raising an
obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length transactions.” Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (1972).
157. Janet Dolgin & Lois Shepherd, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 45–46
(Wolters Kluwer Aspen Casebook Series, 3d. ed. 2013) (discussing the history
and principles of informed consent to health care).
158. Bunnik et al., supra note 43.
156.
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acceptable.”159 The justifications for CODIS are different because
they need to be different to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.160
The inquiry into the propriety of FGG begins and ends with
the consent of the initial user by their uploading data to an openaccess website. Yes, this consent implicates others, which will be
discussed below in Part H. But there is simply no Fourth
Amendment right of privacy in something uploaded for anyone to
view. Outside the context of a Fourth Amendment search, the
justifications can be, and need to be, different. That does not mean
that the justifications for FGG are inconsistent with those for
CODIS or that the former runs afoul of the latter. By using nonforensic, public databases, detectives are certainly taking advantage
of the law and dodging the warrant requirement. But justifications
for FGG need not mirror those given for searching CODIS, just as
the justifications for searching a peer-to-peer site for child
pornography may be less rigorous than the justifications for
searching someone’s private computer. With CODIS, there are
necessary limitations because the government mandates submission of
samples. It is entirely predictable that the calculation is different with
FGG (requiring less justification) than with CODIS (requiring more
justification).
a. We Do Not Possess Privacy Rights in Our Pedigree
Opponents of FGG seem to confuse pedigree relationships
with the genetic regions of homozygosity that revealed them. FGG
employs the GEDMatch algorithm to find a percentage of shared
genetic material, which in turn predicts relationships. But there is
nothing inherently private in our pedigree, especially when viewed
from the perspective of someone actively seeking pedigree
information.
Even if the distant relative were told that her GEDMatch
profile linked her to a suspected serial killer, it is hard to see how this
revealed private information. It is potentially embarrassing and
sensitive. But is it private, just because it was unknown? Many vital
statistics and records are public. In the ordinary course and absent a
closed adoption, we do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy

Ram, supra note 11.
See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (holding that conducting a
DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so
invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that
occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and
the search of a location).
159.
160.
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in our pedigree.161 If my cousin visited the genealogical archives in
Salt Lake City, Utah, and through a search of public military,
property, voting databases and birth records, discovered that our
great uncle had deserted the army in the Korean War, and then
disclosed this information on her social media account, would this
constitute “private” information that was revealed? Under tort law,
the answer is no. I might not have known this information, but
legally, obscurity is not the same as privacy.
If instead we focus on the disclosure that the person to whom
we are related is a likely rapist and serial killer, this is also not private
information. Joseph DeAngelo had three daughters and a
granddaughter.162 Could any of them successfully argue that their
privacy rights were violated when the Sacramento County police
held a press conference to claim that Joseph DeAngelo, their close
relative, was a suspected murderer and rapist? And if they could not
claim that disclosing this fact violated their privacy, then how could
an even more distant relation? If all that was “revealed” by the
investigation was the relationship, it is hard to imagine that these
distant cousins possess a privacy right that is greater than those even
closer in relation to the suspect. Viewing the pedigree information
this way, the FGG did not reveal any private information at all.
b. While It Is Not Perfect, FGG May Actually Reduce
Surveillance of Innocent People
Opponents of FGG are also concerned that it will result in police
“taking samples from various members of the family tree, even
though they aren’t suspects.”163 Indeed, in the Golden State Killer
case, the police took DNA surreptitiously from two suspects who

161. Of course, the legal rights that attach are very different from
interpersonal expectations, as many families seek to keep pedigree information
private. One might argue that those seeking to keep pedigree information
private should have to overcome a rebuttable presumption that this information
should not be allowed to be private. Courts could employ something like a “best
interests” test, adopted from family law, to determine whether disclosure of
pedigree information would result in a net harm to the child. Examples of when
that might not be disclosed until maturity might include incidents of incest or
rape.
162. Avi Selk, All We Know About Joseph DeAngelo, the Golden State Killer Suspect
Who Became a Suburban Grandfather, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2018),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/26/josephdeangelo-golden-state-killer-suspect-was-normal-grandpa-according-toteen/?utm_term=.d186d54572a2.
163. Oreskes et al., False Starts in Search for Golden State Killer Reveal the Pitfalls of
DNA Testing, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2018), www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meln-golden-state-killer-dna-20180504-story.html.
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proved to be innocent.164 False leads will certainly lead to testing
genetic samples to exclude, rather than include, people as suspects.
But on balance, will FGG obviously lead to more harassment of
innocent individuals? Given the alternative methods of
investigation, such as DNA Dragnets,165 high-pressure interviews,
and regular surveillance, it does not seem so. The trick is for law
enforcement to use the most reliable FGG and genealogical methods
to home in on as few targets as possible and then quickly obtain a
warrant to collect genetic samples from them.
A case that opponents of FGG often cite as a cautionary tale
involves a very different form of “familial matching” than that used
by FGG. A filmmaker, Michael Usry, Jr., was wrongly arrested for
the murder of an 18- year-old girl in Idaho Falls.166 Police uploaded
crime-scene DNA to a small publicly-searchable database, YSearch,
previously owned by Ancestry.167 Using Y-chromosome testing, the
crime-scene DNA yielded a “partial match” with Michael Usry Jr’s
father. Y-chromosome testing is different from the dense autosomal
SNP profile now used by 23andMe, Ancestry, and GEDMatch. It
produces haplotype group data that runs in a patrilineal line,
connecting us to the ancestors of our deep, deep past. Because of
this, connections can be quite remote, and unlike FGG, do not
suggest a recent common ancestor. Y-chromosome matching is
useful when there is a mixture of male-source and female-source
DNA, and law enforcement wants to isolate the male DNA.168
However, this method of ancestry testing is not very precise and is
no longer used by CODIS for offender matching. This is because
“men with matching Y-profiles are related in extended patrilineal
clans, many of which may not be represented in a given
database.”169 Thus, the partial match in this case was much weaker
than would be a finding that two individuals share significant
portions of their autosomal DNA through SNPs.
Id.
Manfred Kayser, Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Predicting Human Appearance
from Crime Scene Material for Investigative Purposes, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS,
Sept. 2015, at 33. DNA Dragnets can be carried out in communities where no
DNA profile match is obtained through CODIS. In these cases, hundreds or
thousands of individuals who live near the crime are asked to “volunteer” to
provide a saliva sample for STR profiling through CODIS. Non-participation
might invite suspicion, and thus direct investigators toward following up with
that individual. Also, participation by the suspect’s close relatives can allow for a
partial or distant match, especially if the suspect is a male and Y-chromosome
STRs are used instead of autosomal STRs.
166. Molteni, supra note 150.
167. Id.
168. Mikkel Andersen & David Balding, How Convincing Is a Matching YChromosome Profile?, 13 PLOS GENETICS e1007028 (2017).
169. Id.
164.
165.
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Even so, despite this weak partial match, law enforcement
used very weak circumstantial evidence of Usry’s connection to
Idaho, and the fact that he made a film about a grisly murder, to
deem Usry the chief suspect. After obtaining a warrant to have
YSearch provide the name of the partial match, police arrested and
detained Usry for over a month.170 He was ultimately cleared
through a direct comparison of his DNA to the crime-scene DNA.171
This is a deeply concerning outcome. This case exposes the potential
for misusing weak genetic matching data, in conjunction with very
little circumstantial evidence, to detain someone for far too long.
Usry cannot get this time back, and even though he was cleared of
the charges, those who read about his arrest might always be
suspicious.
The problem here, however, is not unique to FGG. False arrests
and false leads are inevitable in any investigation. Far from
trampling on privacy rights, FGG and other DNA methodologies
may actually reduce invasions of privacy and biased prosecutions by
law enforcement. Without solid physical evidence like a DNA
match, investigations and prosecutions are often left to the discretion
of law enforcement, who must often rely on unreliable sources of
information such as telephone tip-lines, eyewitness testimony, or
psychological profiles. A DNA match through FGG also reduces the
need for intrusive investigations of the innocent, which might
include quasi-voluntary DNA Dragnets172 and eliminate the implicit
or explicit racial biases that impact investigations.173
If the prosecutor’s office is aggressive and a jury can be
convinced, weak evidence can lead to many wrongful convictions.
Methods such as FGG, combined with DNA Phenotyping,174
provide a more efficient and less discretionary means of
apprehending suspects in many murder and sexual assault cases.175
In addition to protecting the rights of the innocent, it also means that
Molteni, supra note 150.
Crimesider Staff, Privacy Concerns After Public Genealogy Database Used to ID
"Golden State Killer" Suspect, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018),
www.cbsnews.com/news/privacy-concerns-after-public-genealogy-databaseused-to-id-golden-state-killer-suspect.
172. Victor Toom et al., Approaching Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of Emerging
Forensic DNA Phenotyping (FDP) Technologies Comprehensively, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L:
GENETICS, May 2016, at c2 (questioning the truly voluntary nature of each
person’s contribution of their sample for a DNA Dragnet, given the suspicion
that may be aroused from non-submission).
173. Brief DNA Saves et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-19,
State of Maryland v. King, 548 U.S. 435 (2013) (No. 12-207).
174. See R. Williams & M. Wienroth, Social and Ethical Aspects of Forensic
Genetics: A Critical Review, 29 FORENSIC & SCI. REV. 145, 146-147 (2017).
175. See Ray A. Wickenheiser, The Business Case for Using Forensic DNA
Technology to Solve and Prevent Crime, 7 J. BIOLAW & BUS. 34, (2004),
www.dnaresource.com/documents/BusinessCaseforDNA.pdf.
170.
171.
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justice will more likely be served for the many victims of violent
crimes.
3. Debunking the Claim that Law Enforcement Cannot Lie
When Investigating Cases
Critics of FGG have questioned law enforcement’s use of
FGG to arrest Joseph DeAngelo, claiming they deceived
GEDMatch by submitting the Golden State Killer’s DNA under a
false name.176 Others have gone one step further, suggesting that the
investigators’ use of a fake identity to upload the crime-scene DNA
profile to GEDMatch might raise questions about the legality of the
evidence.177 Though we may not like it, law enforcement
consistently engages in deception when investigating crimes. In
some cases, due to the trickery of the perpetrators of crime, it might
be necessary to use similar countermeasures to arrest them. As
deception may even be used to encourage, if not coerce, a confession
of a crime, it is certainly constitutional when applied to deceiving the
rest of society.178
For example, in Holland v. McGinnis,179 an officer lied about
the strength of the evidence against the defendant, which in part
caused the defendant to confess. The court held that this lie alone
was insufficient to make the confession involuntary, as it did not
“overcome Holland’s will by distorting an otherwise rational choice
of whether to confess or remain silent.” 180 The Court went on to say
that “[o]f the numerous varieties of police trickery … a lie that
relates to a suspect's connection to the crime is the least likely to
render a confession involuntary.”181
Court, supra note 55.
Kolata & Murphy, supra note 148. In September of 2019, the
Department of Justice issued an interim policy on Forensic Genetic Genealogy
(FGG), which prohibits investigations under the jurisdiction of the federal DOJ
from submitting a crime-scene derived SNP profile under false pretenses to a
DTC company or third-party site like GEDMatch. This may not be as
restrictive as suspected, given that GEDMatch and FamilyTreeDNA explicitly
permit law enforcement to submit profiles for forensic purposes. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 52.
178. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). In Frazier, the Supreme
Court held that police deception is a relevant factor in determining whether or
not a confession is voluntary, but that it must be analyzed under the totality of
the circumstances to see whether the deception violated due process. The Court
concluded that “[t]he fact that the police misrepresented the statements [the
codefendant] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this
otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.” Id.
179. 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992).
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also People v. Rubio, 911 N.E.2d 1216, 1235 (Ill. App. 2 Dist.
2009). (“[M]isrepresentations, of course, may cause a suspect to confess, but
176.
177.
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Trickery is also legal when law enforcement uses it to obtain
DNA samples for identification purposes. In Commonwealth v.
Ewing,182 police gave the defendant cigarettes, a meal, and a soft
drink, with the hope of collecting and testing his discarded DNA.
The police pulled a DNA profile from the cigarette butt that
matched DNA from the rape kit. The defendant moved to suppress
the evidence “because it was the product of an illegal ruse.”183 The
Court, in finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the DNA from the cigarette butt, confirmed that “[t]he
police have been permitted to employ a ruse [even] to gain entry
into a [person's] home in certain situations…There was no evidence
of coercion. Under the circumstances, the ruse, if it was one, was
proper.”184 Many other state courts have held similar ruses,
specifically to obtain DNA, are constitutional.185
Detectives may also impersonate others to obtain DNA
samples from suspects. For example, in State v. Athan, police officers
pretended to be attorneys at a fake law firm.186 They sent the
defendant a letter, asking him to join a fictitious class action
lawsuit.187 Athan believed the request to be true and returned the
letter. Law enforcement pulled a DNA profile from the envelope,
which Athan presumably licked when sealing it. Athan was arrested
for murder based on this DNA sample, and he moved to suppress all
incriminating DNA evidence. The court held that obtaining the
saliva sample in this case did not violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights. Law enforcement officers have also been
permitted to lie to defendants to get them to submit a DNA sample
to exonerate them from a fake crime.188 However, if the State’s
manipulation or deception goes too far and is found to have
improperly coerced the defendant, the consent to providing the
DNA sample will be void.189
causation alone does not constitute coercion; if it did, all confessions following
interrogations would be involuntary because “it can almost always be said that
the interrogation caused the confession.”).
182. 67 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 540, aff'd, 449 Mass. 1035 (2007).
183. Id.
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. See Piro v. Guyer, No. CV 08-372-M-BLW, 2010 WL 985735, at *1
(Idaho Mar. 15, 2010); State v. Christian, 723 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa Ct. App.
2006); Marino v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016);
People v. Sterling, 869 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (2008); People v. LaGuerre, 815
N.Y.S.2d 211 (2006).
186. 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007).
187. Id.
188. See Wynche v. State, 987 So.2d 23, 24 (Fla. 2008).
189. See State v. McCord, 833 So.2d. 828, 829 (Fla. Dist. Court. App.
2002).
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Detectives may also impersonate inmates or co-conspirators
to procure confessions. In Illinois v. Perkins,190 the defendant made
incriminating statements to an undercover officer who was posing as
a fellow inmate in the prison. The defendant was incarcerated for a
burglary, but the police suspected he was involved in an unrelated
murder. The defendant moved to suppress the incriminating
statements he made to the undercover cop. The Court held that
coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect, and the
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent does not protect a suspect
from boasting of criminal activity in front of people they think are
cellmates.191
Law enforcement officers are allowed to engage in deception
and subterfuge to identify criminals for prosecution.192 Given the
extent of this permitted conduct, it seems quite unlikely that the use
of false names to submit samples to GEDMatch would render this
evidence inadmissible. Even so, the recently issued DOJ guidance
on the use FGG states that law enforcement should always identify
themselves when submitting samples, and that they should not do so
under an alias.193 As FamilyTreeDNA and GEDMatch now
explicitly allow forensic use, this does not seem like a big obstacle.
To be clear, this is not to say that police deception should be
encouraged or that it is even ethical, and the analysis of discarded
DNA should but does not require a warrant. Instead, this Article
merely suggests that the critique of police deception through FGG
will fall flat in the courtroom. The evidence will not be excluded
because detectives submitted the DNA sample to GEDMatch under
a false name. There is substantial case law to support the use of
deception, even vis-à-vis criminal defendants. Here, the deception
was toward a private entity, which was not the subject of the
investigation. As a result, this is even more likely to pass
constitutional muster. Because our guiding light in these analyses is
the Constitution, ironically the privacy rights of innocent parties are
even less protected than those of the criminal suspect.
4. Debunking the Claim That Informants Must Be Asked First
Before Providing Inculpatory Information

496 U.S. 292 (1990).
Id. at 297-98.
192. Confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated so
long as the methods used are not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue
statement. See C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Admissibility of Confession as Affected by Its
Inducement Through Artifice, Deception, Trickery, or Fraud, 99 A.L.R.2D 772, 783
(1965).
193. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52.
190.
191.
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Several critiques of FGG contend that it is unfair to force
individuals to unknowingly become informants against their distant
relatives.194 An early article on the topic stated “fierce objections” to
FGG, as privacy advocates “maintain that it turns family members
into genetic informants without their knowledge or consent.”195
Given the amount of deception that is permitted under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, it is not surprising that to be admissible,
incriminating information need not be voluntarily and intentionally
shared. Providing more examples outside the genetics context might
help make this clearer.
The DTC genetic testing users who uploaded their genetic
information online “to facilitate self-discovery” probably had no
idea, up until last year, that they could become “criminal informants
vis-à-vis their own families.”196 Of course, if a DTC genetic
company claimed not to share genetic information without a
warrant or court order and then shared this information in violation
of its terms of service, the user could sue for breach of contract. But
GEDMatch and other databases were so attractive to law
enforcement because their terms of service implicitly, and then
explicitly, allowed this sort of use. There is a reason that detectives
did not attempt to search 23andMe or Ancestry: their terms of
service would not allow it, at least not without a court order or
subpoena.
However, the critique is not that GEDMatch violated its
terms of service. Rather, the claim here seems to be that law
enforcement should not be allowed to use deception to turn family
members against one another, without their consent. The subtext of
the question “did you realize you could be an unintentional
informant against your family member?”197 suggests that
prosecution witnesses are ordinarily asked whether they would like
to provide incriminating testimony.

“People who submit DNA for ancestors testing are unwittingly
becoming genetic informants on their innocent family,” Steve Mercer, the chief
attorney for the forensic division of the Maryland Office of the Public Defender,
told the Associated Press. “[Such users] have fewer privacy protections than
convicted offenders whose DNA is contained in regulated databanks," he said.
Nancy Dillon, Cops Tracked Down Golden State Killer With Genealogy Website That
Keeps Users' Genetic Info Public, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018),
www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/public-genealogy-website-led-golden-statekiller-arrest-article-1.3958936.
195. Selk, supra note 151.
196. Guerrini, supra note 8.
197. See Matthew Feeney, “Genetic Informants" and the Hunt for the Golden State
Killer, THE CATO INSTITUTE, CATO@LIBERTYBLOG (Apr. 30, 2018, 4:11 PM),
www.cato.org/blog/genetic-informants-hunt-golden-state-killer.
194.
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Any criminal defense attorney will tell you this is not how it
works. Instead, it goes something like this: a cop knocks on your door
after your next-door neighbor is murdered, asks whether he can
come in and ask you a few questions, then pulls out a notepad and
begins probing you for details. He might ask questions like “when
was the last time you saw your neighbors, how close were you, and
did they fight?” In the course of answering these questions, you
might inadvertently provide incriminating evidence against the
victim’s husband. You mention that you saw him in the driveway
cleaning out the trunk of his Subaru from about 5:00pm-6:00pm.
You know this because you were watching your favorite TV show at
the time, and this is when you popped your head out the window to
see from where the vacuum sound was coming. Your neighbor, the
husband, told the police he was alone at a movie theater at this time.
The medical examiner puts his wife’s death at about 5:00pm that
evening. Your testimony shatters the husband’s alibi. Whether or
not your testimony will be admissible will not hinge at all on whether
you were asked first whether you were intending to incriminate the
suspect.
Quite simply, we do not have a right to be asked first before
we provide incriminating testimony against others. We possess rights
against self-incrimination due to the Fifth Amendment. But a
prosecution witness’s testimony is not rendered inadmissible just
because she gave the testimony before realizing that it would be
incriminating.
5. Debunking the Claim That FGG Is a De Facto Universal
Database
Critics of FGG have also argued that it creates a shadow, de
facto universal federal genetics database, populated with our private
information that we never agreed to share. They argue that if we
think law enforcement should be allowed to use FGG to arrest
criminals, then we should have an open conversation about the
propriety of a population-wide database, which some already
recommend on privacy and fairness grounds.198 However, if a

Elizabeth Joh, A Consumer DNA Testing Company’s Alarming New Marketing
Pivot, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2019, 4:26 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/familytreedna-dna-testing-solve-crimeslaw-enforcement.html; In response to law enforcement’s use of FGG, some
criminal law and privacy advocates have suggested we instead adopt a universal
genetic forensic database, accessible only through a warrant. For a serious
proposal for a universal forensics genetic database, see James Hazel et al., Is it
Time for a Universal Genetic Forensic Database?, 362 SCIENCE 898, 899-900 (2018).
198.
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universal, forensic database is the goal, they say, “we should arrive
there directly, not as a de facto matter.”199
But by asking whether we would be okay with a database like
this, established by the federal government, opponents of FGG
sidestep the crucial aspect of this methodology.200 These databases
are not “established” by the government. The databases are not
created, stored, or maintained by the government. Individuals are
freely, voluntarily, and enthusiastically populating these nongovernmental databases. This distinction matters and needs to be
given more weight.
Consider when someone posts pictures of you on social media
without your consent. Parents are the worst offenders, posting so
many pictures of their non-consenting children that there is now a
term for this: “sharenting.”201 One group of researchers discovered
that of the 25,727 photographs parents posted on Facebook, 75.5%
of those inspected contained a child between the ages of 0 and 8
years old.202 Nearly 40% of parents posted over 100 photos of their
child.203 The large majority of these pictures also contained
information such as the child’s name and birthdate, which along
with the location of their birth could be sufficient to predict their
social security number.204 By posting information about children,
who cannot consent, parents are creating a digital footprint that
might have unforeseen consequences.205 Even so, it would be strange
to claim that these pictures could not be accessed by law
enforcement if they were to become relevant to a child welfare case.
In addition to Facebook asserting a license in posted
206
photos, courts have recognized that “Facebook itself does not
guarantee privacy.”207 Courts have held that “generally, the
photographs posted on a social networking site are neither privileged
nor protected by any right of privacy, regardless of any privacy
Id.
Ram, supra note 12.
201. Anna Brosch, When the Child is Born Into the Internet: Sharenting as a Growing
Trend Among Parents on Facebook, NEW EDUC. REV. 225, 229 (2016).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from
Public Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 10975, 10975 (2009); see also
Brosch, supra note 201.
205. Brosch, supra note 201, at 234.
206. “While the person taking the picture may retain a copyright, Facebook
users grants Facebook ‘a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free,
worldwide license to use any content that [the user] post[s] on or in connection
with Facebook.’ This means that Facebook can license a user's content to others
freely without obtaining any other approval from the user. Once a user's pictures
or videos are shared on Facebook, the content remains in backup copies.” See
Jessica Ronay, Adults Post the Darndest Things: (Ctrl + Shift) Freedom of Speech to (Esc)
Our Past, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 86 (2014).
207. Nucci v. Target Corp., 162 So. 3d 146, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
199.
200.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640

46

COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.

[Vol. XXI

settings that the user may have established.”208 If we do not have
privacy rights in the “sharenting” photos parents post, then what
about photographic evidence that raise suspicions of criminal
activity?
Somewhat shockingly, criminals often share information about
their crimes on social media. Sometimes, photographs include
images of co-conspirators, holding guns or drug paraphernalia on a
public street, or boasting about the “hit” they just did.209 Whether
or not the photograph is staged or real, posting these sorts of images
is reckless, as prosecutors can use them to prove aspects of any
criminal case. Specifically, they may be used to claim that the
defendants are members of a gang, which may increase their
sentence.210 If I am a co-conspirator in the picture who never agreed
to have my photo taken, and in fact vehemently protested it being
uploaded to Instagram, do I have a right for it not to be used against
me? The answer is no. Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter are not de
facto government databases. They are public and semi-public data
warehouses, with scores of once-private information that law
enforcement can exploit. The use of GEDMatch is not that different
from a Facebook user with lax privacy settings, whose posts all
default to “public.” If detectives search that user’s Facebook profile
and find incriminating photographs or posts, they are not doing an
“end-run” around the Fourth Amendment. They are taking
advantage of a legal source of data.
6. Debunking the Claim That Individuals Do Not Want to
Participate in GEDMatch to Help Solve Cold Cases
While we probably should not rely on what consumers want
when crafting privacy policies, as many are unaware of privacy
risks,211 it is simply not the case that most Americans find FGG
creepy and dystopian. Banning FGG denies many people the
opportunity to assist in cracking cold cases. While many speculate
Id. at 153-54.
See Post, Shoot, INVISIBILIA (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:03 AM),
www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=700738025; see also
Aaron Leibowitz, Chicago Public Schools Monitored Social Media for Signs of Violence,
Gang Membership, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 11, 2018, 4:00 AM),
www.propublica.org/article/chicago-public-schools-social-media-monitoringviolence-gangs.
210. Tony Rizzo, Most Gang Members Use Social Media, Study Finds, GOVTECH
(Oct. 15, 2013), www.govtech.com/public-safety/Most-Gang-Members-UseSocial-Media-Study-Finds.html.
211. Sara E. Brown, An Illusory Expectation of Privacy: The ECPA is Insufficient to
Provide Meaningful Protection for Advanced Communication Tools, 114 W. VA. L. REV.
277, 290 (2011) (“Evidence suggests that few users read privacy policies let alone
change default settings.”).
208.
209.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640

2020]

WHY WE FEAR GENETIC INFORMANTS

47

that being a genetic informant against their distant relatives would
be disdainful, the truth is that most people support this use, and some
even want to actively participate. When the developers of
GEDMatch first heard about the site’s role in arresting the Golden
State Killer, they expected to quickly hemorrhage users. They
certainly did not envision an outpouring of support. However, they
received “5,000 new uploads to the site shortly after Mr. DeAngelo’s
arrest—a daily record.”212 It is clear that not only do the large
majority of Americans support FGG, especially when used to solve
violent cases,213 but that banning this methodology would result in
far fewer cold cases being solved.
7. Debunking the Claim That FGG Mandates Familial Consent,
Where Other Intimate Sharing About Family Members Does
Not
Thoughtful scholars writing in this area have suggested that
family members ought to get the consent of relatives before
uploading their information to sites like GEDMatch.214 Even some
clinical researchers have proposed requiring familial consent, given
that hereditary diseases run in families and the information therefore
implicates multiple branches in the family tree. Their rationale is
that genetic information is unlike other data that we enthusiastically
share online because genetic data is immutable, and sharing one’s
data exposes the data of one’s relatives without their consent.
Not so fast. A relative’s genotype cannot be neatly predicted
for most complex traits, given how random and noisy inheritance
can be. This is an important point that needs to be underscored.
Having access to my mother’s DNA does not tell you whether I am
a carrier for any particular disease or whether I will be affected by a
genetic mutation. Put more simply, if you knew my mom had the
genes for blue eyes, that does not tell you whether I have those same
genes, or whether my eyes are, in fact, blue. Since most traits are not
autosomal dominant and do not follow simple Mendelian genetics,
knowing about someone’s SNPs will not tell you much about their
cousins’ genetic mutations or health risks.
Murphy, supra note 65.
Guerrini, supra note 8 (Among 1587 respondents, the majority
supported police searches of genetic websites that identify genetic relatives (79%)
and disclosure of DTC genetic testing consumer information to police (65%).
Respondents were much more supportive when the purpose was to identify
perpetrators of violent crimes (80%), crimes against children (78%) or missing
persons (77%) than when used to apprehend non-violent crimes (39%)).
214. Ram, supra note 12; Susan Wallace et al., Family Tree and Ancestry Inference:
Is There a Need for a Generational Consent?, 16 BMC MED. ETHICS 87 (2015).
212.
213.
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Despite these aforementioned caveats, there remains
significant concern about the ability of our relatives to spill our
collective genetics beans. One of the major critiques of FGG is that
your relatives could expose your genetic information or could place
you under criminal suspicion through their genealogical research
without your consent. But this is fear-mongering.
The “you” in question here is the donor of semen or blood
taken from a crime scene or a rape kit. It is the criminal’s own actions
that placed his or her DNA under scrutiny. It may be true that the
criminal’s name could only be revealed by virtue of his or her
relative’s contribution to a DTC genetics website. But it was not the
GEDMatch user’s actions that first placed the suspect under
scrutiny. This focuses too much on the reliable identification
methodology, rather than the criminal’s actus reus.
The risk of inadvertent third-party disclosure is much greater
with genetically simpler diseases. Knowing that my mother has an
autosomal trait tells you quite a bit about me and greatly increases
the risk that I will either express or carry the trait. But even then,
whether my mother decides to share her genetic disease with others
is her choice. While ethically it would be more appropriate for my
mother to consult with her close, affected family members before
sharing this information with others, it is ultimately her story to tell.
Outside of pedigree and identification, we should be
concerned about more nefarious uses by law enforcement or private
actors. If the mutations are highly penetrant, quite heritable, and
extremely deleterious, we might reasonably be very worried about
other people having access to some small and unknown subsect of
our genetic information that we never consented to share. Even in
these cases, however, analogies to public disclosure of private facts
cases suggests that the GEDMatch users would not be liable for
uploading their SNP profile to a public site.
c. The Tenancy by the Entirety Analogy Is Not a Good Fit for
the Reality of Genetic Information
Legal analysis often turns on which metaphor you select. In
a powerful article by Natalie Ram, Ram suggests that we conceive
DNA through a property framework, considering the insights
provided by the doctrinal metaphor of “tenancy by the entirety.”215
Ram creatively argues that just as tenancy by the entirety forbids
one spouse from encumbering shared property without the other
215.

(2015).

Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 918–19
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spouse’s consent, so too should familial database matching.216 The
government’s storage and use of “source-excluding partial matches
would encumber the portions of identifiable genetic information
shared between known offenders and their close genetic relatives[,]”
and thus require the innocent relative’s consent.217 The tenancy by
the entirety concept is clever, but it does not track DNA interests
very well. For one, we do not “own” our DNA in a technical sense,
even though some DTC sites claim that their users own their
genomic information. It is not real property, which turns out to
matter, as we cannot sell or alter the property rights. More
important, however, is the fact that individual DNA mutations do
not have much value on their own. With the exception of just a
handful of diseases, we must know more about the other protective
and deleterious mutations on other alleles in order to process what
a particular mutation likely means. We also would need to know
more about the individual’s diet, history, and life experiences. The
property framework overstates our ability to value any isolated piece
of DNA.
Also, practically speaking, we are not required to obtain the
consent of our family members when we undergo genetic testing or
receive test results. These results might implicate a relative’s health
interests, such as when a mother tests positive for BRCA-1, which
marks an increased risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer. For
purposes of a tort duty to disclose, courts often expect that if any
duty exists, it likely resides with the family member proband, who is
expected to communicate these BRCA-1 results to their
daughters.218 Of course, this expectation might be misplaced. But if
a duty exists at all, it does not require the proband to keep her
information private. Rather, it suggests we might have duties to
disclose this information to others. This recognizes that privacy
interests are different when it comes to genetic risk, which is
analogized in these cases to communicable disease.219
Further, courts cannot be expected to disentangle the
property interests shared even by close relatives like sisters, as they
share different percentages of genetics among and between them.
216. Id. (Familial database searching “constitutes an unlawful effort by the
government to encumber not only an offender’s interest in her identifiable
genetic information, but also the interest of the offender's closest kin.”).
217. Id. at 920.
218. See Safer v. Estate of Pack, 291 N.J. Super. 619, 625 (N.J. Super.
Court. App. Div. 1996). For a general discussion of the tort duties to warn family
members of genetic risk, see Teneille R. Brown, Needles, Haystacks and NextGeneration Genetic Sequencing, 28 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 263 (2018).
219. Safer, 291 N.J. Super. at 625 (“There is no essential difference between
the type of genetic threat at issue here and the menace of infection, contagion or
a threat of physical harm.”).
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This would become even more unwieldy if we were instead
discussing property rights in shared regions of homozygosity
hovering around 1-2% of the genome, which would vary from one
cousin to another.220 Would the property right be determined at the
level of the SNP, or at the level of the collective, polygenic risk? Or
only for SNPs that predict clinically actionable traits? The fact that
we still do not know much about the connection between genotypes
and phenotypes suggests that a property framework will not work.
Finally, because our genetic information is increasingly being used
for precision medicine, these applications implicate autonomy and
substantive due process much more than encumbrances on shared
real estate.221 Substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment would likely prevent governments from requiring the
permission of each sibling before making autonomous,
individualized health care decisions.222 While it might be ethically
appropriate for probands to discuss their genetic test results with
family members and request permission from them before sharing
those results with others, their results are currently their own.
Rather than analogizing DNA to property, an analogy to
non-genetic information seems to make more sense. After all, what
is concerning to privacy scholars is the use of this DNA to make
interpretations, however shaky, about someone’s ancestry, identity,
or health risks. It is not the DNA, qua DNA, that is protected. It is
the translation from DNA mutations to our health and identity that
contains informational value.223 Thus, metaphors sounding in
disclosure of information, rather than encumbrance of property, are
probably more useful for thinking about the legal implications of
sharing genetic data.

220. But see Ram, supra note 12 (“[C]ourts should look to other forms of
shared material to illuminate analysis about when an individual has a sufficient
interest in searched genetic data that does not derive from their own cells.”).
221. Alessandro Blasimme & Effy Vayena, Becoming Partners, Retaining
Autonomy: Ethical Considerations on the Development of Precision Medicine, 17 BMC MED.
ETHICS 67 (2016).
222. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
2844 (1990). (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law. This notion of bodily integrity has been
embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally required for
medical treatment.”).
223. Julyan Cartright et al., DNA As Information: At the Crossroads Between
Biology, Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, 374 PHIL. TRANS R. SOC. 20150071, *7
(2015) (“The genetic code is not a book nor part of it; rather, it is a translation
dictionary between two different worlds (languages), i.e., the world of nucleic
acids and the world of proteins . . . Moreover, little is known about the
grammar, the syntax, and even the orthography of the book of life.”).
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d. The Metaphor of Memoir Provides a Much More Useful
Framework for Analyzing Genetic Privacy in This Domain
Autobiography provides a very useful, if imperfect,
metaphor for the sharing of our genetic information with others. Just
as the memoirist reveals information that is mostly “her story,” she
is also telling part of the private stories of others, who never
consented to this story being told. Further, just as with
autobiography, the genetic story told by the author is colored by
each sibling’s unique contribution and idiosyncratic perspective.224
If an account or memory is disputed, it is difficult for the reader to
unravel the different threads to determine which part of the story is
true and whether the sources are reliable. One First Amendment
scholar argues this gives memoirs greater, rather than less, narrative
power.225
This sort of imperfect accounting is also true for the
information shared in our genomes. Even close relatives like siblings
have very different genomes, or genetic stories, that cannot be
surmised from our own. Furthermore, it can be difficult to determine
what we share versus what is unique. Even still, outside readers
might draw inferences about a heritable trait and presume that we
are carriers until proven otherwise, so we might expect family
members to keep this sort of information private. Finally, just like
with genetics, our family story is what it is, and it cannot be changed.
Of course, we can reinterpret our history and memories, but the
facts that underlie them exist in the past and are immutable. Once
someone knows about a private aspect of our past, such as our
parents abusing drugs or that we were conceived through rape, we
cannot change these facts, just as we cannot presently change our
autosomal genes.
There is a flourishing memoir ethics literature that discusses
how authors ought to tell their stories, knowing that in so doing they
are divulging others’ secrets.226 F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night
is a gut-wrenching autobiographical account of his wife’s sad descent
224. See Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiographical
Speech, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 905, 933 (2006).
“This ambiguity over the truth or falsity of memories is even more
pronounced when the stories involve not just provable facts but human
relationships, emotions, or reactions…[t]hus, there might be argument that
there is something uniquely valuable about individual memories, perceptions,
and viewpoints on personal life events regardless of their verifiable accuracy.
Under this view, autobiographical speech might be deserving of protection
beyond the boundaries of basic defamation law.”
225. Id.
226. Carolyn Ellis, Telling Secrets, Revealing Lives, 13 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY
3, 14 (2007).
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into madness. While many readers appreciated the honesty of the
story, some questioned Fitzgerald’s “right to violate Zelda’s privacy,
with no realistic opportunity either for consent or for telling her story
her own way.”227 In the present context of genetics, researcher and
author Alex Wexler wrote a loving memoir about her mother’s
Huntington’s disease and her own research to help discover its
genetic causes.228 Recognizing the moral complexity of her memoir,
Wexler grappled with the “potentially severe consequences [of her
disclosures] for people she cares about.”229
There are certainly ethical quandaries authors face when
choosing to tell their stories that implicate the stories of their parents
and siblings. Sometimes auto-biographies include intensely personal
accounts of rape,230 addiction,231 or incest232 that occurred in the
family home, which other family members would rather keep
private. But even in these cases where the shared content is deeply
sensitive and potentially embarrassing, the courts have almost
always sided with the authors.233 The individual’s First Amendment
right to “tell her story” usually trumps the family member’s
expectation of privacy. This is true even when the subject whose
227. Martha Montello, Confessions and Transgressions: Ethics and Life Writing, 36
HASTINGS CENT. REP. 46, 46 (2006).
228. Alex Wexler, Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family, Risk, and Genetic Research,
U. CAL. PRESS (1996).
229. Montello, supra note 227.
230. “The Court must believe that the First Amendment greatly
circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for the
publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind
that people want very much to conceal.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d
1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing a rape victim being identified in a book as
being unable to bring a public disclosure of private facts claim against the
publisher).
231. “This is my story…It's not my mother's story and it's not the family's
story, and they may remember things differently and they may choose to not
remember certain things, but I will never forget what happened to me, ever, and
I have the scars from it and I wanted to rip those scars off of me.” Buzz
Bissinger, Ruthless with Scissors, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2007, at 104, 108 (quoting
author of Running with Scissors, Augusten Burroughs, describing why he wrote the
piece).
232. Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. App. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1128 (1994).
233. “[T]here is an additional interest in this case: Kaysen's right to disclose
her own intimate affairs. In this case, it is critical that Kaysen was not a
disinterested third party telling Bonome's personal story in order to develop the
themes in her book. Rather, she is telling her own personal story-which
inextricably involves Bonome in an intimate way. In this regard, several courts
have held that where an autobiographical account related to a matter of
legitimate public interest reveals private information concerning a third party,
the disclosure is protected so long as there is a sufficient nexus between those
private details and the issue of public concern.” Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767,
2004 WL 1194731, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2004).
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private information is being revealed had no part in the construction
of the memoir.234 One court went even further, suggesting that
whether or not the underlying material is newsworthy is irrelevant
to whether the author has the right to reveal “her own identity.”235
It is presumed that she possesses this right, even if exercising it means
revealing private information about those close to her.
These cases are instructive as applied to our genomic
information. When I choose to obtain genetic tests to complete my
genetic story, either to assist in precision genetics treatments or to
connect with distant relatives, I am writing my story. I am gathering
information and sharing it because it is my autonomous choice. This
decision might indirectly implicate the privacy of others, and it
might hurt them. Consider for example, a family who identifies as
Native American only to discover through genetic ancestry testing,
that there is no evidence, at least according to Ancestry’s algorithm,
that this family folklore is true. Do I have a privacy interest in my
family’s ancestry story? Perhaps. Will the law recognize this and
protect it from disclosure by a family member? No. Just as with
memoir, where “it is often difficult, if not impossible, to separate
one's intimate and personal experiences from the people with whom
those experiences are shared,” it is likewise difficult to separate out
which traits or SNPs run in your family, what those SNPs predict in
isolation and in your particular pedigree, and what that shared
genetic information reveals about any one person.236 Put differently,
Alex Wexler can certainly publish her story about her family’s
experience with Huntington’s disease without being liable for an
invasion of privacy claim. The case law is clear on this point.
However, we are dealing with an even more amorphous kind of
privacy threat. When my genetic story becomes even less concrete,
and involves describing potential genetic risks rather than actual
disease symptoms, the right to privacy for my relatives becomes even
weaker.
Of course, one could argue that when police surreptitiously
submit crime-scene DNA samples, they are forcing someone else to
“tell their story” and connect with family members against their
wishes. In one sense, this is true. But once again, given that the DNA
is significant evidence of having committed a criminal actus reus, the

There is a First Amendment privilege to publish truthful information of
legitimate public concern, and the privilege encompasses dissemination of
information relating even to individuals who have not sought or who have
attempted to avoid publicity. See Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397
(5th Cir. 1980).
235. Anonsen, 857 S.W.2d at 705.
236. Bonome, 2004 WL 1194731, at *6.
234.
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privacy rights in that DNA are substantially diminished.237 It hardly
seems controversial ethically, and is certainly true legally, that a
criminal has relinquished the right to tell his own story with his
DNA. The law is utilitarian when it comes to privacy, not absolute.
Because the purpose was to identify a murderer, the public certainly
has an interest in the disclosure of the crime-scene DNA to
GEDMatch to find a relative, if not in knowing its specific content.238
In conclusion, existing law would not require anything like
familial consent before law enforcement could use FGG. Genomes
are individually unique constructions, and the value of an entirely
different genome, with a different combination of mutations and life
experiences, cannot meaningfully be compared through the tenancy
by the entirety metaphor. Assuming that our genes have
independent property value, without any accompanying
information about environmental risk or the interactive effects of our
genes, relies on genetic determinism, wherein we assume we can
know someone from their genes alone.239
Despite its allure, the property metaphor (which I assume is
not meant to be literally implemented) just does not work well in the
context of sensitive and highly idiosyncratic DNA information.
Specifically, alienation, valuation, transfer, license, sale, etc., would
be unwieldy. Not only does the case law make clear that family
members can reveal photographs and private, scandalous family
histories, but it really must be this way.
If family members were required to obtain the consent of
their relatives before obtaining genetic test results or sharing them,
would that extend only to immediate family members, or to anyone
with shared DNA, including some holdout who could be a fourth
cousin? Could a fourth cousin keep me from sharing my BRCA-1
results with my granddaughters? Given that most people do not
consider their fourth cousins to be within the boundary of their
“family,” and given that without a service like Ancestry they would
likely not even know who these fourth cousins were, it is a bit
preposterous to suggest that their consent would be legally (as
opposed to ethically) required ex ante.

Hodge, supra note 146.
“[A]n involuntary loss of privacy is recognized in the modern
formulations of this branch of the privacy tort, which require not only that the
private facts publicized be such as would make a reasonable person deeply
offended by such publicity but also that they be facts in which the public has no
legitimate interest.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir.
1993).
239. This concept will be discussed in more detail in Section H.
237.
238.
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Most importantly, in the context of precision medicine, it
would be appalling to require an individual to receive her siblings’
consent before undergoing genetic testing. Even without genetic
testing, information about particular diseases (such as breast cancer,
or depression) is already known to run in families. Family members
often know their history; the genetic information may just confirm
whether they are a carrier or at risk, but it’s not a surprise that this
risk is familial. Given the way this risk data is understood and
communicated, an approach that treats it like information is far
preferable.
G. Why Do Scholars Fear Genetic Informants?
1. Our Fear of Genetic Informants Reflects Moral
Dumbfounding
As explained in the sections above, very few of the privacy
concerns surrounding FGG stand up to scrutiny. In many cases, the
arguments against FGG illustrate a form of “moral
dumbfounding,”240 where opponents find the method morally
questionable but cannot locate a good argument as to why. Jonathan
Haidt described this phenomenon as thinking like a “lawyer trying
to build a case rather than a judge searching for the truth.”241 Moral
dumbfounding leads to weak rationalizations for things that seem
intuitively immoral (and may indeed be immoral, but for reasons we
cannot articulate).
In some cases, critiques of FGG, based on an intuitive sense
that it is immoral, have worked. Legislators in Maryland proposed
bans on this useful prosecutorial tool because of inflated privacy
concerns. These concerns reflect a misunderstanding of criminal
procedure and of the status quo ante. The fact that such bright legal
minds can be so confused about the actual privacy implications of
FGG intimates that there is something deeper at work. This is more
than just a failure to analyze case law precedent on the Fourth
Amendment, witness testimony, the police use of deception, or the
invasion of privacy.
2. Our Fear of Genetic Informants Reflects Genetic Essentialism

Jonathan Haidt et al., Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No
Reason, in 1 No. 2 LUND PSYCH. REP. 1, 1–29 (Dep’t of Psychology, Lund Univ.
ed., 2000).
241. Joshua May & Victor Kumar, Moral Reasoning and Emotion, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 139, 142 (Karen Jones et
al. eds., 2019).
240.
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The reason, I suggest, that leads to these fears is subconscious
endorsement of genetic essentialism. First, essentialist thinking leads
people to believe that genetic explanations are truly exceptional.
Therefore, relevant precedent is immediately and always
distinguishable. Second, it leads people to believe that genes are
more deterministic than they actually are. This in turn encourages
an overemphasis of genetic causes of behavior over environmental
factors and a need to protect these immutable blueprints from
disclosure. Third, when people think about genes in essentialist
ways, they may adopt genetic vitalism, where an almost mythic
agency or intentionality is attributed to our genes. Vitalism may
explain the view that FGG is “dystopian” or “creepy,” as we
consider our genes to be unintentional informants. This might
explain why some fail to disambiguate the inanimate DNA from the
individuals’ actions, which allowed others to access the DNA.
Essentialist thinking has been demonstrated in many
different cultures and contexts. We all engage in it to a degree.
However, some people are more essentialist than others, and some
topics, such as genetics, tribalism, or race, lead people to engage in
more rigidly essentialist thinking. Essentialists find greater causal
power in people’s fixed characters than in their surroundings, and
assume that much of one’s behavior can be explained with reference
to the essence that they have.242 This sort of thinking is on display
when we think that something represents “who we truly are,” in a
way that is “deep down and internal,” “naturally determined,”
which “draws the boundaries” between social groups, and can be
“transferred from individual to individual while preserving their
original identity.”243 Natural things have an essence; synthetic things
do not. In this way, essences are often conceived of as something like
a soul, like chi in Chinese cultures or prana among Hindus.244 Given
these chief features, it is no wonder that genetics so handily lends
itself to essentialism.
It seems some of the critiques of FGG sound in the type of
genetic essentialism that treats genetics as completely exceptional.
This might explain why scholars have failed to properly consider
precedent regarding privacy and criminal procedure. They may
assume that our genomes cannot be properly analogized to anything
that has come before. In some ways, our genomes are special and present
novel concerns about privacy. Namely, while we might disclose our
genomes today, the predictive power of our genomes will continue
242. Steven Heine et al., Essentially Biased: Why People are Fatalistic About Genes,
55 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 142 (2017).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 148.
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to grow. Ten years from now, we will likely know even more about
disease risk and penetrance than we do now, and that makes sharing
genetic data related to disease risk very different. However, when
SNP data are used to identify relatives, it is not taking on a form that
is radically different from public archives, peer-to-peer sharing of
pornographic files, or searching of social media posts. When it comes
to the ways genetics is being used in the service of FGG, there are
no sufficiently strong reasons to justify its exceptional treatment.
Genetic essentialism leads people to do a number of strange
things. For one, they will “over-attribute a person’s characteristics
and behaviours, in all of their complexity, to their genetic
makeup,”245 and they will tend to view genetic risk factors as being
more causal, or deterministic of outcomes, than they actually are.246
This has the related effect of discounting other causes of disease,
behavior, or identity, such as culture, diet, or the environment.247
There are a handful of diseases wherein genes operate in hard,
deterministic ways, and for which you could actually have “a gene
for” the disorder that means you will definitely develop that
condition. These Mendelian traits are actually pretty rare. Even so,
“people overgeneralize from these to the far more common
conditions where genes are not at all deterministic.”248
Genetic determinism might move us to accord genes more
heightened privacy protections than are warranted for their specific
use. In the deterministic view, genes are perceived to so completely
control our future that this justifies our need to keep them secret. I
strongly suspect that some of the “moral dumbfounding”
surrounding FGG has to do with precisely this. We worry about
people having access to genetic information because we assume that
there is a one-to-one relationship between genotype and phenotype,
and that if we have a mutation that increases the risk of depression
or addiction, we will certainly develop depression and addiction.249
This makes genetic information much more sensitive, as it is
perceived to provide a crystal ball for our future.

245. Ilan Dar-Nimrod et al., Genetic Knowledge Within a National Australian
Sample: Comparisons with Other Diverse Populations, 21 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS
133, 134 (2019).
246. Wren Gould & Steven Heine, Implicit Essentialism: Genetic Concepts Are
Implicitly Associated With Fate Concepts, PLOS ONE, June 2012, at 1.
247. Ilan Dar-Nimrod & Steven J. Heine, Genetic Essentialism: On the Deceptive
Determinism of DNA, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 800, 800 (2011).
248. Heine, supra note 242, at 150.
249. Id.; see also Mark Henderson, ‘Fat’ Gene Found by Scientists, THE TIMES
(U.K) Apr. 13, 2007, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/fat-gene-found-by-scientistsvbf7scwhhnn.
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In reality, the SNPs that are used to make disease predictions
explain very little of the variance between individuals, so this data is
currently of limited individual predictive value.250 Most complex
diseases are caused by many different mutations that interact with
one another in as-yet-unknown ways. DTC results also fail to
capture varying genetic expression, which is affected by lifestyle
choices and environmental risks.251 However, for some diseases,
such as Alzheimer’s, the identified variants are linked to a substantial
increase in the risk of developing that disease, and they are thus more
clinically useful. In the future, DTC companies might rely on
sequencing the entire genome, which would provide vastly more
information on rare diseases than that which is gleaned from just
SNPs alone. The potential for using genetics in increasingly
predictive ways means we should be mindful of the privacy and
security of our genetic data. But this sort of prediction is not
inherently at stake with FGG.
Long before we knew about the structure of the double helix,
biologists debated whether biology could be explained solely by the
principles of physics and chemistry.252 Many eighteenth and
nineteenth century biologists theorized that biology contained
metaphysical and spiritual properties, which might never be
knowable through the laws of the hard sciences. This came to be
known as “vitalism,” where biological processes were imbued with
agency, desires, and ultimate goals.253 Vitalism is now largely
discredited and dismissed as superstitious.254 Even so, vitalism is alive
and well in our folk understandings of biology. Without being able
to prove this directly, I suspect that some of our suspicions of the
“genetic informant” or the “biowitness” have to do with our subtle
and subconscious misattribution of agency and intent to our genes.
Anthropomorphism is a “false positive bias” where we overattribute human-like characteristics such as agency, intention,
purpose, or volition, to objects that possess no such capacities.255 It
can happen with inanimate objects, as well as with non-sentient
organisms. Even if it is incorrect, it is the result of an over-active and
fascinatingly adaptive cognitive process.256 Because the
Park et al., supra note 27.
Bunnik et al., supra note 43, at 344.
252. Marc Kirschner et al., Molecular Vitalism, 100 CELL 79, 79 (2000).
253. Monica Greco, On the Vitality of Vitalism, 22 THEORY, CULTURE &
SOC’Y 15, 16 (2005).
254. Id. at 15.
255. Marco Antonio Correa Varella, The Biology and Evolution of the Three
Psychological Tendencies to Anthropomorphize Biology and Evolution, FRONTIERS IN
PSYCHOL., Oct. 2018, at 1.
256. Id. at 10.
250.
251.
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anthropomorphism tendency is so pervasive, involuntary, and
deeply-rooted, it is studied in many different disciplines. Within
cognitive psychology, it is called “teleological obsession” or
“overactive intentionality bias,” and is employed to explain why
people presume intentionality where there is no evidence of its
presence.257 Within psychiatry, it is known as “hyper-mentalizing”
where it sheds light on why people with schizophrenia or other
mental illnesses might imbue mailboxes and computers with secret
intentions and surveillance capacities.258 As applied to biological
processes, this tendency is often referred to as vitalism.259 Regardless
of what you call it, there is consensus that anthropomorphism is
expressed at such a young age, and is so powerful and automatic,
that it feels (and may indeed be) innately hardwired.260 We can
therefore be forgiven for engaging in the particular form of
anthropomorphism that implicitly recognizes intentional action in
our genes.
If one thinks of FGG as employing DNA as “genetic informants”
or “biological witnesses,”261 it calls to mind something out of a
dystopian science fiction novel. The use of these
anthropomorphizing labels suggests that it is in fact the DNA itself
that is testifying against you. This is of course deeply unnerving, in
part because of humanity’s inherent desire to control its
environments. If an independent and intentional genetic informant
can speak for us in this way, this reveals something profoundly
scary—that we humans are not fully in control of our actions or their
consequences. This is particularly troubling when the consequences
seem so great. Rather than being able to decide whether to implicate
our relatives in a crime, our genes are seemingly making this decision
for us, without our consent. I suspect that this phenomenon is also
at the root of our response to FGG.
Viewing FGG as employing “genetic informants,” as many
of its opponents do, exploits the psychological fear of losing control
of our environment and our free will.262 Humans have a strong
desire to “master their environments by increasing the
environment’s
predictability”
through
its
“apparent
controllability.”263 Put simply, if we are not controlling our genes,
we fear that they are controlling us. The need to feel in control of
our environments is referred to as “effectance motivation,” and is a

Varella, supra note 255, at 1–4.
Id. at 1, 2.
259. Kirschner et al., supra note 252.
260. Varella, supra note 255.
261. Kayser, supra note 165, at 45.
262.
Nicholas Epley et al., On Seeing Human: A Three-Factor Theory of
Anthropomorphism, 114 PSYCHOL. REV. 864, 872 (2007).
263.
Id.
257.
258.
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big driver of anthropomorphism.264 Attributing human-like
properties to biological entities enables a sense of familiarity and,
therefore, control over them.265 This in turn provides a feeling of
comfort when interacting with these agents.266 Ironically, we employ
anthropomorphisms to make us less afraid of losing control.
However, because our brains evolved to over-apply it in novel
contexts, it can actually make us more afraid of unintentional agents,
like robots or genes.267
Of course, our genes are not intentionally testifying against
us. But given the pervasiveness of anthropomorphizing, especially
toward a biological phenomenon like genes, it would not be at all
surprising if this causes our strong negative reaction to FGG. The
language of the “genetic informant” or “biowitness” unnecessarily
imbues the DNA with properties that it does not possess. For our
purposes, these terms are misleading because they obfuscate the
intentional actions of ordinary people.
III. CONCLUSION: REFORMS THAT BETTER ADDRESS THE REAL
PRIVACY CONCERNS OF FGG, WITHOUT HAMPERING THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES
Secondary use of genetic information by private actors
without consent should certainly give us pause. And the unlimited
potential uses by the government should also generate considerable
worry. But by focusing on the Fourth Amendment concerns of FGG
when it is used exclusively by law enforcement to identify the
perpetrators of crime, privacy advocates emphasize the wrong
privacy boogeymen and thus propose the wrong remedy. We should
not ban FGG when used to identify suspects in cold cases. We might,
however, decide that DTC genetic companies, while technically
consumer enterprises, might share enough features with clinical care
to legally require additional consent measures before people
participate. We might also limit the secondary uses of DTC genetic
information in some meaningful ways. I briefly sketch out the
justifications for these very different reforms below.
a. Statutory Secondary Use Restrictions
I suspect it would be different if, rather than using regions of
homozygosity and ancestry information, law enforcement
264. Adam Waytz et al., Making Sense by Making Sentient: Effectance
Motivation Increases Anthropomorphism, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 410, 410 (2010).
265.
Id.
266.
Id. at 879.
267.
Id. at 872.
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connected the family through a rare and serious disease mutation
that ran through the family, and was evidenced in health records or
a SNP profile. If law enforcement identified and publicized that the
GEDMatch user was affected, this would likely run afoul of legally
recognized privacy rights. But even if this had been the case, there is
no indication that law enforcement would ever need to reveal the
rare mutation discovery to the GEDMatch user, just as they never
identified Joseph DeAngelo’s distant relative who provided the
genetic connection that led to his arrest.
The possibility that law enforcement, or other commercial
entities, could glean clinically relevant information from
GEDMatch profiles is troubling. And yet, because users voluntarily
uploaded their SNP data to an open-access, amateur genealogical
website, they have no recourse under existing law, at least against
secondary data users.268 In order to better address this sort of harm,
we must educate consumers more about the vast amounts of data
they are sharing with sites like GEDMatch, or even 23andMe and
Ancestry. There also should be significant secondary use limitations
that delineate how law enforcement may and may not use the
genetic profiles that they, and other private actors, have obtained.
Perhaps we need a federal statute that allows law enforcement or
private entities to use these SNP profiles only to identify perpetrators
after they have committed crimes, to identify the remains of bodies,
or to reunite displaced persons or victims of human trafficking with
their families. There could conceivably be limitations on the types of
crimes for which it could be used, based on political sentiment.
As far as we know, law enforcement has not yet used SNP
data to do anything other than identify suspects of serious crimes. If
we fear that law enforcement could use this data to predict health
traits or conduct internal research, then the solution is not to ban
268. The relatives of the family member (proband) who uploaded her data
to GEDMatch may theoretically have a right of action in tort law against the
proband. For example, if I upload my SNP profile to GEDMatch, or some other
third-party site with insufficient privacy protection by design, my daughter might
be able to sue me for public disclosure of private facts, if the state court were
willing to find that this sort of disclosure was embarrassing, unreasonable, and at
least reckless. However, this might not be recognized, depending on how strong
the public interest is in the disclosed information. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487–91 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7
(1967); see also Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.1975). The
purpose of the tort remedy is to protect the individual against unwarranted
publication of private facts. The individual’s right to privacy must be balanced
with the privilege of the press to publicize matters of public interest that arise out
of the desire and “the right of the public to know what is going on in the world
and the freedom of the press and other information agencies to report it.” See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1979).
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FGG. It is not just the police who have access to this rich SNP data.
Anyone who has access to SNP profiles could upload genetic SNP data
to a public site and search for the sample’s relatives. This is because
GEDMatch and FamilyTreeDNA do not require any identity
authentication.
Rather than banning FGG, the solution to this sort of
problem is to craft thoughtful legislation that limits certain
secondary uses of DTC genetic information. Obvious candidates
would be prohibiting the use of SNP data to price health, life or
disability insurance, or increasing the fines associated with detection
of these uses. Unfortunately, the federal statute prohibiting the use
of genetic information to make health insurance coverage or
employment decisions might not account for low detection rates,
and the scope of GINA’s broad exceptions have been insufficiently
fleshed out.269 Another candidate would be requiring specific
consent to use samples in research. A large part of 23andMe’s
business model rests on the secondary use of genetic samples for
health research. By sharing SNP data with outside researchers,
promising research is being pursued that will help us treat cancer or
heart disease more effectively. Not all secondary uses are sinister.
But we might reconsider the model where simple disclosure of many
terms and acceptance by consumers is considered legally sufficient.
b. Mandatory Updates of the Consent Process for DTC Genetic
Tests
Multiple reviews of the consent process for DTC genetic
testing reveal that the user agreements and consent procedures are
wholly inadequate, especially given that no physician is made
available to explain the risks and benefits.270 There is a reason that
countries like France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Portugal
demand that physicians be involved in the ordering of any genetic
test.271 Regulators in those countries appreciate the enormous risks
posed by the inappropriate delivery and interpretation of this sort of
information. Consumers of DTC genetic tests may not understand
how to interpret the various findings. There are mutations
associated with tiny relative risk increases, mutations with unknown
expression or population penetrance (because many DTC tests are
Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future
of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 728 (2019). For example, employers can use
genetic information that they obtain inadvertently or via commercially available
documents, like newspapers that contain obituaries.
270. Clayton et al., supra note 14.
271. Louiza Kalokairinou et al., Legislation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
in Europe: A Fragmented Regulatory Landscape, 9 J. COMMUNITY GENETICS 117, 123
(2018).
269.
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run in asymptomatic individuals, the likelihood of someone
developing the disease associated with a mutation is unknown), or
mutations of unknown significance. Further, DTC tests have varying
levels of laboratory and clinical quality. Some are not reliable,
meaning that many runs of the test will produce varying results, and
some are not valid, meaning that the results do not mean what we
think they do. We also might worry about this sort of sensitive
information being relayed without the possibility of counseling to put
the findings in context. For these reasons and others, many countries
require that genetic susceptibility tests only be performed as part of
clinical care. These countries therefore require physician
involvement and patient-informed consent.272
A recent review of European regulations found that fourteen
countries had specific requirements for informed consent for DTC
genetic testing. Some of these countries require meaningful
disclosure of all relevant risks and benefits, a right “not to know” the
information should they change their mind before the results are
delivered, and appropriate time be given before the test and after
disclosure for the individual to consider consenting.273 There is
considerable variation among countries regarding which DTC
genetic tests require informed consent, what must be present in the
consenting process, and the consequences of non-compliance. In
Germany, for example, failing to provide advance, express written
consent is punishable by imprisonment or a fine. 274
Regrettably, the United States has not taken this approach.
Instead, in the U.S., DTC genetic testing operates largely outside of
the realm of “health care,” despite interacting with it in many ways.
Consumers who undergo testing may become patients who seek
physicians’ help confirming or interpreting the results. They also
may use the testing to decide whether to have a preventative
procedure like a hysterectomy or whether to become involved in
clinical research. Another large number of them may never use the
data in an officially clinical way, but it might subtly change the way
they think about their health, and for-profit entities might exploit
their data in ways that affect the individual’s access to care in the
future. Even so, DTC testing in the U.S. is considered mostly
recreational. Thus, testing generally does not require physician
involvement or clinical informed consent. This is the root of the
problem. Despite perhaps being ethically required, outside the

272.
273.
274.
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context of clinical care and research, the requirement for informed
consent is not widely recognized.275
As a result, a few different research teams have documented
the consent processes for DTC consumer tests and found them
troublingly flawed. Indeed, the use of the phrase “consent processes”
is misleading, as most DTC genetic testing companies just employ
user agreements that consumers must click on in order to use the
services or website. Third-party sites like GEDMatch have been
found to have particularly poor procedures for documenting
agreement with the terms of service.276 For most DTC genetic tests,
users find privacy protections important and desire control over the
dissemination of their genetic information. However, they
mistakenly assume that the DTC genetic companies are fully
protecting their privacy rather than sharing their data with thirdparty researchers.277 A study of DTC genetic testing companies
targeting Canadian consumers found that “67% provided
information insufficient for consumers to determine how their data
and sample would be treated.”278 This is alarming, and certainly
indicates that a significant part of our trouble with FGG might stem
from concerns over meaningless consent at initial stages of testing.
Although more companies now meet guidelines relating to
transparency regarding data security protocols, few companies
disclose which secondary uses of users’ data would be permitted,
with whom they would contract, how long the information would be
stored, and what might happen in the event that the company was
sold or went bankrupt. This finding was supported by smaller, more
in-depth studies, which revealed failures to convey the risks of reidentification and to obtain proper consent for the secondary use of
data.279 The privacy and security risks are critically important, given
Bunnik et al., supra note 43, at 343.
Lauren Badalato et al., Third Party Interpretation of Raw Genetic Data: An
Ethical Exploration, 25 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 1189, 1190 (2017).
277. Clayton et al., supra note 14; Juli Murphy Bollinger et al., Attitudes About
Regulation Among Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Customers, 17 GENETIC TESTING
AND MOLECULAR BIOMARKERS 424, 424-28 (2013); Saskia Sanderson et al.,
Public Attitudes Toward Consent and Data Sharing in Biobank Research: A Large Multi-site
Experimental Survey in the US, 100 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 414, 414–27 (2017);
Sara Chandros Hull et al., Patients’ Views on Identifiability of Samples and Informed
Consent for Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 62, 66 (2008).
278. Amanda Singleton et al., Informed Choice in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
(DTCGT) Websites: A Content Analysis of Benefits, Risks, and Limitations, 21 J. GENETIC
COUNSELING 433, 433 (2012).
279. Linnea I. Laestadius et al., All Your Data (Effectively) Belong to Us: Data
Practices Among Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Firms, 19 GENETICS IN MED. 513,
513 (2017); Emilia Niemiec & Heidi Carmen Howard, Ethical Issues in Consumer
Genome Sequencing: Use of Consumers’ Samples and Data, 8 APPLIED TRANSLATIONAL
GENOMICS 23 (2016).
275.
276.
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the market value for this sort of data and the temptation for unsavory
companies to hack into databases to glean genetic and phenotypic
information for research.280 Unfortunately, these concerns have only
been amplified with the increasing use of more modern and
thorough genetic sequencing technologies.281
It is not uncommon for commercial entities to exploit the
appearance of being “medical” to confuse consumers into thinking
the experience has the legitimacy and scientific backing of the
healthcare system. Based on a review of their advertising practices,
many DTC genetic testing companies seem to do exactly this.282
Several were found to exploit the professional legitimacy of a clinical
encounter to establish trust between the company and the consumer,
while in their small print user agreement they disavowed many of
the regulatory protections that come with clinical experiences such
as informed consent, HIPAA compliance, and notification and
opportunity to withdraw data if the user no longer wishes to
participate in the research database.283 Clinical care obviously
differs considerably from consumer advertising, both in its ethical
and legal requirements. It is important for consumers to know what
they are buying and sharing.
Medical ethics requires that clinicians respect the autonomy
of their patients by disclosing all relevant risks and benefits of a
procedure or test before it is performed. This has become so standard
that the law of every state now requires informed consent in order
for physicians to be free from either negligence or battery liability.
More modern takes on informed consent stress that disclosure,
wherein the clinician provides information in written form and
obtains a signature by the patient, should not be a mere formality.
Rather, to affect meaningful informed consent, patients ought to be
able to understand enough of the procedure to ask questions and
have time to reflect before making a decision. They also ought to be
given the opportunity to change their consent status, when possible.
However, none of these legal or ethical standards have been
found to apply to DTC companies because they are regulated as if
they provide a purely commercial service. This is a mistake. It may
be that part of the reaction to FGG lies in consumer discomfort with
law enforcement having access to our genetic information, or a
misunderstanding of who has access to this complex information in
Laestadius et al., supra note 279; Niemiec & Howard, supra note 279.
Niemiec & Howard, supra note 279.
282. Manuel Schaper & Silke Schicktanz, Medicine, Market and Communication:
Ethical Considerations in Regard to Persuasive Communication in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing Services, 19 BMC MED. ETHICS 56 (2018).
283. Id.
280.
281.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640

66

COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.

[Vol. XXI

the first place. This suggests our consent process is not working, and
for this and other reasons, it might be unwise to allow consumers to
be tested “recreationally” for genetic mutations that carry potential
for significant future non-recreational uses.
Because genetic information is so complicated, it is not
possible to provide all the relevant risk and benefit information in
one setting, particularly if done online. Informed consent for DTC
testing ought to include an initial layer of basic information on how
the saliva sample will be obtained, the laboratory procedures, and
what tests may be run on that sample.284 Customers should also be
told about the risks of false positives, false negatives, and laboratory
errors. If consumers affirmatively click to agree to these conditions,
then a second layer of information should convey background
knowledge on genetic expression and penetrance. This layer should
include videos and images to simplify the complex information and
identify and use some traits with high and low penetrance and
expression as examples. Consumers should then be given notice on
what others with this data can do with this information. This layer
should include information about GINA, and what it protects. It can
also describe how our genetic information does not change over the
course of our lifetime and how this information could be used to
identify us or others through methods like FGG. Again, the use of
interactive videos might be useful to help illustrate the data behind
these processes.
Next, if someone is interested in pursuing genetic
information about health risks, there ought to be another layer of
consent where consumers are briefed on the different kinds of health
risk data. Specifically, consumers should have to opt-in to receive
carrier or susceptibility information regarding penetrant health
traits, particularly for which there are no known treatments or for
which there is a significant and negative prognosis for either
themselves or their offspring. Examples of this would include
disclosing risks of Huntington’s disease or Alzheimer’s disease.285 It
is shocking that companies are not required to run these tests
through a medical provider, given the potential psychological
impacts of the results.
Some consumers may altruistically wish to contribute their
genetic information to a database used for research purposes. If
consumers agree to participate in a commercial research database
managed by the DTC company, and have their samples or personal
information used by research teams, then another layer must explain
284.
285.

Bunnik et al., supra note 43.
Bunnik et al., supra note 43, at 345.
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this process in detail. Consumers must be told what types of research
might be conducted, what personal information of theirs will be
used, how they might be later identified using this data, and with
whom the data might be shared. Because genetic information—even
when stripped of our names, birthdates, addresses, and other readily
identifiable information—still has the potential to identify us and is
immutable, consumers should have the opportunity to stop
participation in this research at any time. Of course, this cannot
undo the research and data sharing that has already occurred, but it
is important in the event that a research company is sold to a less
reputable company that one may then change the user agreement
and protections.
Third-party sites like GEDMatch should also require a more
robust consent procedure. If the sites are not conducting the tests
themselves, they would not need to discuss laboratory errors and the
risks of false negatives and positives. However, they should still be
required to explain with whom the data might be shared, how it will
be stored, and what data security and privacy measures will be taken
to encrypt the data. Even where data can be uploaded anonymously
with a pseudonym, users should be informed of the risks of reidentification by triangulating data from birth and death records and
other accessible genetic databases.
Regardless of which mutations the consumers agree to have
tested or shared, they should be given the DTC company’s contact
information (a phone number or email), which must be maintained
so long as the company is marketing their services, where they can
direct questions and be told how and with whom their information
will be stored and shared in the future. The fact that U.S. law does
not require any sort of informed consent for DTC genetic testing
means that the quality of the consent processes vary considerably.
Consumers are therefore only protected through consumer
protection statutes, which are notoriously weak at preventing
misrepresentation.286
While the specifics of what would be necessary for
meaningful informed consent will need to be worked out in
particular detail by others, we should at least agree that consumers
need better information before they, perhaps naively, upload their
genetic information online. We have mistakenly assumed that
genetic information could be given directly to consumers, without
the involvement of health care professionals. Unlike the measures

286.
Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons
from the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 140 (1999).
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taken in Europe and elsewhere, we have also failed to require
specific privacy and security protections for data shared online.
Millions of Americans have already submitted their SNP
profiles to public sites like GEDMatch, exposing colossal amounts of
personal data to strangers. The review of the DTC companies’
consent processes reveals that many fall short of providing adequate
information. That means that countless consumers are submitting
their saliva or cheek cells, being tested, and then sharing their genetic
information online, without appreciating the full risks of doing so.
This is the true problem with FGG. The many privacy concerns
advanced in opposition to FGG would largely subside if we made
sure that consumers had meaningfully consented to the initial test,
and that they had appreciated the volume of data contained in our
genomes and how it was being shared. If consumers appreciated the
privacy, security, and re-identification risks of genetic testing when
they first submitted their saliva or blood sample, as well as when they
then uploaded their data to a third-party site, we could feel more
confident in law enforcement’s use of this data in their investigation
of crime. But our initial suspicions about the quality of the
consumers’ consent to DTC testing is spilling over into a misplaced
concern about FGG. Coupled with our tendency to attribute
intentionality to inanimate objects like DNA, to think that genetics
plays a larger role in predicting our futures than the environment
does, and to feel discomfort with not having control over who (or
what) “speaks” for us, we have allowed far too much fear of genetic
informants to take hold. Privacy advocates have misdiagnosed the
problems with FGG and have thus proposed the wrong remedy—
banning FGG. Rather than feeding into this unwarranted fear and
banning the methodology, we must directly address the risks at their
roots. We can do this by shoring up consent to DTC genetic testing
and passing legislation aimed at prohibiting certain secondary uses
of genetic data.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE:
1. Install the two included fonts on your system:
a. Baskerville Italics.ttf
b. Baskerville Normal.ttf
2. Open this template, then press Ctrl+S to save the new
document before any material is added.
3. Update information on front page, including:
a. Header (Remember, they are different on odd and
even pages and both of them need it):
i. Year
ii. Volume
iii. Short Article Title (all caps, but no brackets)
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iv. Starting Page Number (Insert>Page
Numbers>Format)
1. The formatting on this has gotten
weird in later versions of word. It’s
largely intuitive how to fix it, it’s just
incredibly important that it be fixed.
2. Additionally, ensure that you
appropriately end up on the
odd/even header (odd has page
number on right, even on left)
STLR Block
i. Volume Number
ii. Season and Year of Publication
Article Title
Author Name
Front Page Footnotes
i. Author’s information
ii. Perma-link (URL where “article may be
cited as”)
1. The perma-link has two variables,
volume and article. The text that
follows the = sign for each of those
variable names is set as the variable.
The & stops the interpreter and tells
it another variable is coming. A perl
script runs on the website that
interprets those perma-links. BUT
ONLY IF YOU SET THE
VARIABLES RIGHT
a. This perl script was in effect
starting with Volume 16,
prior volumes follow a
different naming convention,
and are dealt with in the
script, accordingly.
2. After “volume=” (with no spaces)
type the Arabic numerals of the
volume number this article is to be
published in.
3. After “article=” (with no spaces) type
whatever name you gave to the pdf
as it will be saved in filebase without
the “.pdf” part (this should be the
author’s last name, but adjust if other
articles in the current volume share
that last name or if other necessities
dictate)
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4. Upload the article to the category for
the current volume on filebase.
a. So if Example.pdf in Volume
99, it would be saved in
volumes/volume99 on file
base
b. Then it would have hyperlink
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?
volume=99&article=example
c. Institutional history should
have a video that
demonstrates how to do this,
and how the perl script
works.
d. Make sure the splash page on
the website reflects this URL.
Open the full “Styles” window by clicking on the dropdown arrow in the bottom right corner of the “Styles” box.
Paste abstract into template at the pre-specified location
and set its style to Abstract.
Paste entire final version of the article (without markup &
comments) into this template
Go through the entire text of the article (excluding
footnotes) and apply the appropriate style to each portion:
a. Heading 1 for high-level headings (I, II, III, etc.)
b. Heading 2 for second-level headings (A, B, C, etc.)
c. Heading 3 for third-level headings (1, 2, 3, etc.)
d. Heading 4 for fourth-level headings (a, b, c, etc.)
e. Heading 5 for fifth-level headings ((1), (2), (3), etc.)
f. Body Text for all general text
g. Block Quote for all block quotes
h. Table Labels for all captions on tables and images
i. Make sure any images are properly
formatted, and centered.
i. Hyperlinks for all URLs (make sure they are live,
but that they look like plaintext)
Make sure headings renumber after each section (if they
don’t left click on the heading>Bullets and
Numbering>Select Restart Numbering).
Make sure all footnote references use the footnote
references style.
a. Open the Advanced Find tool
b. In the “Find what:” field type (without quotes): “^f”
c. Select “main document” in the “Find In” dropdown
menu
d. Return to the main document, all the footnote
numbers in the main document will be selected
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e. Click the “Footnote References” style
10. Make sure the footnotes are full justified (they should be if
the Footnote Text style was properly applied, but I’ve been
having trouble with that).
11. Go through footnotes to check for the following problems
(and apply the solutions)
a. URLs may cause the full justification to look
awkward
i. Press shift+enter between a / and a word in
the URL (do not just press enter, that will
break the link)
b. The spaces between the § and the number in statute
citations may cause the numbers and symbol to end
up on different rows.
i. Replace any spaces with a non-breaking
space (press ctrl+space instead of just space)
12. Update the table of contents by right clicking on it and
selecting “Update field,” then “Update entire table.” Only
entries from Heading 1, 2, and 3 will be shown in the table
of contents. Check them all for correct formatting, and use
Shift+Enter to control the manner in which entries are split
between lines. To add entries from subsequent headings,
increasing the size of the table of contents substantially:
a. Place the cursor at any point of the table of
contents.
b. Choose Insert>Index and Tables>Table of
Contents>Change “show levels” to reflect the level
of heading you want to include.
c. Click OK when Word asks to replace the current
table of contents
d. NOTE: Bill changed the formatting of ToC
headings so they should go to the next line a few
spaces before hitting the page number. DoubleCheck that nonetheless.
13. Footnote numbers in the footnotes will, at this stage, show
up as superscripts with no period or indentation. To format
these correctly. I recommend saving a back-up copy of the
document before this stage.:
a. Press Ctrl+H and go to the “Find” tab
b. In the “Find what:” field, type (without quotes): “^f”
c. Click the “Find In” dropdown menu below and
select “Footnotes”
d. At this point, all footnote numbers in the footnotes
themselves should be highlighted. BE VERY
CAREFUL HERE, as changes may be difficult to
undo. Click on the top of the main document
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window, then press Ctrl+Space to strip the footnote
numbers of their superscript formatting.
e. While all the footnote numbers (in the footnotes
only) are still highlighted, go to the “Replace” tab in
the “Find and Replace” window that should still be
open and type the following string in the “Replace
with:” field (without quotes): “^&.^t”
i. “^&” signifies what was already selected
ii. “.” adds a period after that selection
iii. “^t” adds a tab after the period
f. Click “Replace All” to set correct formatting.
14. Check for consistency throughout.
15. Delete these instructions and rejoice!
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